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DRUGS, DIGNITY, AND DANGER:  
HUMAN DIGNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINT TO LIMIT OVERCRIMINALIZATION 
MICHAL BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL* 
The American criminal justice system is increasingly collapsing under 
its own heavy weight and, thus, requires inevitable change. One notable 
feature responsible for this broken system is overcriminalization—the scope 
of criminal law is constantly expanding, imposing criminal sanctions on a 
growing range of behaviors. One area where overcriminalization is most 
notable concerns victimless crimes, namely, those where individual adults 
engage in conduct that inflicts only harm to self or to other consenting 
adults, but not on third parties. These victimless crimes include prostitution, 
pornography, sadomasochism, gambling, and most notably, drug crimes.  
Despite increasing scholarly critique of the continued criminalization of 
these behaviors—particularly drug offenses—significant limits on the scope 
of victimless crimes have not yet been adopted. Two features characterizing 
criminal law account for this: first, in contrast with criminal procedure, 
constitutional law has not placed any significant limits on substantive 
criminal law, and second, there is no coherent theory of criminalization that 
sets clear boundaries between criminal and non-criminal behaviors.  
This Article proposes a constitutional constraint to limit criminalization 
of victimless crimes and, particularly, to alleviate the pressures on the 
criminal justice system emanating from its continuous “war on drugs.” To 
accomplish this goal, the Article explores the concept of human dignity, a 
fundamental right yet to be invoked in the context of substantive criminal 
law. The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence invokes conflicting accounts 
of human dignity: liberty as dignity, on the one hand, and communitarian 
virtue as dignity, on the other. However, the Court has not yet developed a 
workable mechanism to reconcile these competing concepts in cases where 
they directly clash. This Article proposes guidelines for balancing these 
contrasting interests and then applies them to drug crimes, illustrating that 
adopting such guidelines would result in constraining the scope of 
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The American criminal justice system is under tremendous pressures. It 
is increasingly collapsing under its own heavy weight, thus calling for a 
thorough re-evaluation.1 The system’s illnesses encompass various aspects 
of the criminal process, including failings in both criminal procedure and 
substantive criminal law.2 Indeed, perhaps the feature most responsible for 
this broken system is what scholars have dubbed “the overcriminalization 
phenomenon,”3 in which a growing number of adult individuals are liable to 
conviction for an ever wider range of behaviors.4 
In criticizing the criminal justice system in its current form, scholars 
have mainly focused on procedure, process, and sentencing policies, giving 
less attention to criminal law theory and substantive criminal law. In 
contrast with criminal procedure, which is thoroughly constitutionalized, 
constitutional law places no constraints on substantive criminal law. 5 
Despite occasional calls to adopt constitutional limitations on substantive 
criminal law, scholarly proposals have had no practical effect, as courts 
have failed to develop significant constitutional doctrines for checking 
legislatures’ criminalization choices.6 
However, the broken criminal justice system is in tension with one of 
the fundamental principles of American constitutional jurisprudence, 
namely, constitutional protection of individual liberties and freedom from 
government intrusion into the private lives of individuals.7 The stringent 
criminal process, with its substantive and procedural shortcomings, carries 
tremendous power to jeopardize basic principles of liberty and justice for 
all defendants. Unfortunately, the current criminal justice system falls short 
of satisfying these constitutional commitments.  
Another notable feature of substantive criminal law is the lack of a 
coherent theory of criminalization.8 Scholars have acknowledged that, at the 
                                                
 1.  See Erik Luna, Overextending the Criminal Law, in GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING, 1, 1-4 (Gene Healy ed., 2004); William J. 
Stuntz, Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 507 (2001). 
 2.  See Luna, supra note 1, at 1-4; Stuntz, supra note 1, at 507. 
 3.  See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and 
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748 (2005); Eric Luna, The 
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005). 
 4.  See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(2007). 
 5.  See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1270-71 (1998). 
 6.  See generally Markus D. Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and 
Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 517 (2003-2004) (stating that constitutional scrutiny has 
yet to be applied to substantive criminal law).  
 7.  See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. 
 8.  See HUSAK, supra note 4, at 3-55.  
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theoretical level, criminal law is inconsistent, lacking clear conceptual 
boundaries to criminalization. 9  Scholars have further argued that 
legislatures do not abide by a consistent set of principles regarding what 
matters are appropriate for criminalization, employing the criminal law 
purely as a tool for achieving whatever end majorities choose to pursue.10  
Furthermore, until recently, relatively little scholarship has addressed 
the use of substantive criminal law as a means to limit the scope of the 
criminal justice system. Moreover, criminal law theorists have offered little 
to address the problem of overcriminalization from a theoretical 
perspective, leaving legislatures and courts with too few sources to rely 
upon.11  
Recognizing the scope and implications of overcriminalization, 
scholars have recently ventured into the area of criminal law theory, 
proposing both internal and external sets of constraints to limit the scope of 
criminal law. 12  This Article builds on this scholarship and links the 
emerging U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning human dignity to 
the myriad of constitutional constraints that would limit the scope of 
substantive criminal law by offering a workable mechanism to remedy 
some of the problems associated with overcriminalization.  
Indeed, one area where overcriminalization is most notable concerns 
“vice or morals crimes.” These offenses generally fall into two categories: 
first, individuals who engage in conduct which may inflict harm on 
themselves, but not on third parties, such as recreational drug use or 
gambling; and second, mutually consensual conducts between two or more 
adults that may inflict harm on one or more of these participants. Examples 
of the latter include consensual sexual activities such as prostitution and 
sadomasochism. While arguably, defendants who inflict harm on other 
adults while engaging in consensual behaviors should be able to raise the 
defense of consent when charged with a crime involving the infliction of 
serious physical harm, the law generally denies this defense except for in 
very limited circumstances.13 
This Article questions the justifications for the continued 
criminalization of behaviors that either inflict only harm to self but not to 
others or inflict harm on other consenting adults (hereinafter “victimless 
                                                
 9.  See Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal Law Be Controlled?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 971, 
972 (2010). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See HUSAK, supra note 4. 
 13.  Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 174-75 (2007) (discussing the general rule that consent is typically 
not a defense when serious bodily injury occurs, except in very limited exceptions such as 
sport contests and medical procedures). 
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crimes”).14 More specifically, it examines when and to what extent these 
arguably victimless crimes warrant the government’s intervention through 
criminal regulation. 
The traditional justification for criminalizing conduct that is essentially 
victimless has strongly relied upon the state’s need to enforce morality, a 
position most commonly associated with the famous Hart-Devlin debate.15 
However, legal moralism as a justification for criminalization was explicitly 
rejected in the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas, which struck down as unconstitutional Texas’s sodomy law. 16 
Lawrence ostensibly adopted the Millian harm principle, standing for the 
proposition that a state is not justified in criminalizing a conduct unless it 
inflicts harm upon others. 17  In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia 
predicted that the decision would lead to the invalidation of “[s]tate laws 
against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, 
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity”18 and ultimately result in a 
“massive disruption of the current social order.”19 He further suggested that 
even laws criminalizing heroin use are suspect under the holding.20 But 
Scalia’s dire warnings have not materialized: Lawrence is not viewed as a 
criminal law opinion, thus failing to affect any substantive changes in 
criminal law in general and in the context of victimless crimes in particular. 
Various victimless crimes are still intact and the harm principle has not 
been able to limit their scope. 21  Moreover, Lawrence stands for the 
proposition that in the area of sexual behaviors implicating privacy, 
autonomy, and liberty concerns, the state cannot criminalize such conduct 
unless it can establish that harm to others has occurred. 22  However, 
Lawrence has not been expanded to include limitations on the 
criminalization of other consensual conduct outside the realm of sexual 
behavior, including drug use, which affects other aspects of individuals’ 
autonomous choices.  
                                                
 14.  It is worth mentioning that crimes may be considered “victimless” only when 
competent adults are involved. The discussion in this Article is therefore strictly limited to 
the context of competent adults.  
 15.  See Alice Ristroph, Third Wave Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151, 1154-62 
(2010-11). 
 16.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003). 
 17.  Bergelson, supra note 13, at 184 n.187 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 
(1859), reprinted in THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF LAW 518 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993)). 
 18.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590. 
 19.  Id. at 591. 
 20.  Id. at 590-92. 
 21.  See Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 41 (2011). 
 22.  Id. at 101. 
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This Article’s main purpose is to propose a constitutional constraint 
that will limit criminalization of victimless crimes and, more particularly, 
alleviate the increasing pressures on the criminal justice system emanating 
from the system’s continuous “war on drugs.” To accomplish this goal, the 
Article turns to the concept of human dignity, a fundamental right, which 
has not yet been invoked as a mechanism to constrain overcriminalization. 
Human dignity has been a recurrent theme in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence. 23  While under international law, human 
dignity is a specific right,24 it is not an enumerated right in the U.S. 
Constitution, but rather viewed as a fundamental value, underlying other 
constitutional rights.25 While in recent years the Court has invoked human 
dignity in a growing number of constitutional cases,26 it has done so in 
strikingly different ways, illustrating that there is no single approach to the 
concept of human dignity.27  
One concept of human dignity invoked by the Court implicates a liberal 
theory, which rests on the deontological principles of freedom and 
autonomy (hereinafter “liberty as dignity”). 28  This concept is best 
articulated in the Supreme Court decisions in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey29 and Lawrence v. Texas,30 suggesting 
that in the Fourteenth Amendment, the government protects “choices 
central to personal dignity . . . (such as) the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe and of the mystery of 
human life.” 31  This account suggests that the government may not 
criminalize any conduct that interferes with “choices central to personal 
                                                
 23.  See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2012) (stating that although prisoners 
forfeit their fundamental right to liberty, they retain their right to human dignity); Hope v. 
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002) (stating that cruel and unusual punishment of prisoner was 
“antithetical to human dignity”); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (stating that 
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that punishment in the penal 
context comport with the “fundamental human dignity that the Amendment protects”). 
 24.  See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. I, Dec. 7, 
2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 9 (stating that “[h]uman dignity is inviolable. It must be respected 
and protected.”). 
 25.  See, e.g., William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 47 (Michael J. Meyer & 
William A. Parent eds., 1992); Mark Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 103, 127-28 (2012). 
 26.  See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 183, 207-17 (2011). 
 27.  See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 
189-90 (2011). 
 28.  Id. at 190. 
 29.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 30.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 31.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 861. 
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dignity.”32 A key inquiry after Lawrence is: what types of choices are 
central to personal dignity, and, in particular, whether these choices extend 
beyond the realm of procreation and sexual preferences to encompass 
additional forms of personal choices, such as the right to harm oneself.  
A contrasting concept of dignity invoked by the Court embodies the 
notion of communitarian or collective virtue as dignity (hereinafter:i.e.,  
“communitarian virtue”).33 Under this account, human dignity requires the 
adoption of societal fundamental rights, ethics, and values that every 
civilized society must adhere to. This account rests on a virtue ethics 
theory, which rejects a rights-based approach, suggesting instead that the 
purpose of law is to make people and society virtuous, rather than to 
promote individual rights.34 Adopting this theory also requires the state to 
criminalize consensual activities that do not harm others in order to protect 
collective human dignity.  
The Court, however, has never resolved the tensions between these 
contrasting accounts. A few scholars have proposed using human dignity as 
a constitutional constraint to limit the scope of criminal law.35 However, 
this proposal relies solely on the concept of liberty as dignity, while 
disregarding the contrasting account of human dignity as communitarian 
virtue, which the Court has emphasized in recent opinions. While scholars 
have noted that human dignity is multifaceted, they have neither proposed a 
test that would determine which account of human dignity prevails in cases 
where two concepts clash, nor elaborated on the circumstances under which 
one concept of human dignity outweighs the other. Furthermore, while the 
Court has invoked human dignity in the context of constitutional law, it has 
not yet extended this concept to substantive criminal law.36  
This Article’s goal is to apply the concept of human dignity in the 
criminal law context to limit the scope of criminalization of victimless 
crimes in general, and drug offenses in particular. Acknowledging that the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence invokes conflicting concepts of human 
dignity, this Article attempts to reconcile the competing concepts of human 
dignity in specific categories of cases by introducing a balancing test, which 
would weigh individuals’ interests in retaining their right to liberty as 
dignity against the interests of a virtuous society to preserve individuals’ 
right to dignity under a communitarian virtue account.  
The criminal regulation of drugs offers a potent test case to apply the 
proposed theory, as drug crimes are the most notable example of victimless 
crimes. The criminalization of all forms of recreational drugs and the 
“tough on crime” policy adopted by American criminal law towards drug 
                                                
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Henry, supra note 27, at 189-90. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See Dubber, supra note 6, at 515-16. 
 36.  See Bergelson, supra note 13, at 218-20. 
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crimes take up a significant amount of the nation’s limited resources and 
dominate the criminal justice system. Therefore, this Article focuses mainly 
on drug prohibitions by applying the proposed rules to draw distinctions 
between types of drug crimes. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines previous attempts to 
limit overcriminalization, in general, and victimless crimes, in particular. It 
demonstrates that the harm principle has not offered a sufficient substantive 
constraint to limit the scope of criminal law, and that constitutional law has 
not placed any external limitations on substantive criminal law. Considering 
the empirical failure of the harm principle and its normative inability to 
foster substantive limits on the criminalization of victimless crimes, this 
section concludes that the concept of human dignity might offer an 
alternative means to accomplish that goal.  
Part II lays out the conceptual framework for using human dignity as a 
constitutional constraint on the state’s power to criminalize victimless 
crimes. It examines the current U.S. Supreme Court’s multifaceted human 
dignity jurisprudence in light of the theoretical understandings of this 
concept. Acknowledging that no single account of human dignity is 
absolute, it proposes using a balancing test to determine which concept of 
human dignity prevails in specific categories of cases.37 The crux of this test 
involves weighing individuals’ liberty as dignity against a virtuous 
society’s commitment to preserving communitarian virtue as a means of 
protecting collective dignity.  
Part III introduces guidelines for decriminalizing victimless crimes in 
order to secure individuals’ rights to dignity, liberty, and autonomy, while 
upholding the continued criminalization of activities that endanger 
individuals’ fundamental right to life. 
Part IV applies the proposed guidelines to drug crimes. The proposal 
rests on distinguishing between two types of prohibitions—drug trafficking 
and drug use, and “soft” and “hard” drugs—and applying the guidelines to 
decriminalize use and possession of “soft” drugs while upholding criminal 
prohibitions on use and possession of “hard” drugs and on trafficking in all 
types of drugs. 
I.  ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT OVERCRIMINALIZATION 
Criminal law scholars have vehemently criticized the continuous 
expansion of substantive criminal law, warning against the costs and 
burdens incurred by the criminal justice system, as well as against the 
dangers this expansion poses to individual defendants.38 Scholars note that 
                                                
 37.  See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
683, 685-86 (2007) (proposing a standard of review for considering the individual rights 
approach to evaluating Second Amendment questions). 
 38.  See Luna, supra note 3, at 703-04; see also Beale, supra note 3, at 748-49. 
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there are too many broadly-worded criminal statutes, which cover a wide 
range of behaviors and do not justify the use of the coercive power of the 
state through its extensive employment of criminal law.39 This problem is 
particularly salient in three categories of crimes: offenses of risk prevention 
or crimes of endangerment, such as drug crimes; ancillary offenses, which 
function as surrogates for the prosecution of primary or core crimes 
unlikely to result in prosecution; and overlapping crimes, namely, 
recriminalizing the same crimes over and over again.40 As scholars have 
already addressed the various aspects of overcriminalization,41 this Article 
examines an alternative means to limit the size and scope of criminal law.  
A comprehensive theory of criminalization, elaborating the substantive 
requirements of any criminal statute, could be a natural candidate for 
limiting the scope of substantive criminal law. However, a notable feature 
of substantive criminal law is the lack of a comprehensive theory of 
criminalization, in the absence of which legislatures are free to continue to 
expand criminal law by enacting more offenses and criminalizing additional 
types of behaviors. 42  Without a comprehensive theory, the necessary 
components of new crimes are left undefined and the boundary between 
criminal conduct and conduct that ought to remain beyond the scope of 
criminalization are blurred.  
A.  The Harm Principle’s Empirical Failure  
Following John Stuart Mill’s famous articulation of the “harm 
principle,” many scholars posit that under contemporary jurisprudence, 
harm to others is the key predicate for criminalization.43 The underlying 
view of the harm principle is utilitarian in essence, measuring an action’s 
social utility and overall societal advantages of criminalization against its 
costs and unintended consequences.44 The judicial recognition of the harm 
principle as the core justification for criminalization is best demonstrated in 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas.45 While 
numerous different readings have been offered to Justice Kennedy’s 
majority holding in Lawrence, the harm principle plays a crucial role in all 
of them, as Lawrence has been read to stand for the proposition that the 
harm principle is the key justification for criminalizing consensual conduct 
                                                
 39.  See HUSAK, supra note 4, at 3-54. 
 40.  Id. at 36-41. 
 41.  Id. at 41. 
 42.  See Brown, supra note 9, at 972; see also HUSAK, supra note 4, at 58 (stating that 
until a comprehensive theory of substantive criminal law is developed, it will continue to 
expand). 
 43.  See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 116-17 (1987). 
 44.  Id. at 105-06. 
 45.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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between adults. In other words, when adults engage in fully consensual 
conduct in the privacy of their homes, the state is unjustified in 
criminalizing such conduct.  
However, the practical effects of endorsing the harm principle have 
been limited, raising doubts concerning its actual ability to limit criminal 
law, in general, and criminalization of victimless crimes, in particular. 
Indeed, the harm principle’s failure to offer a comprehensive account for 
criminalization is twofold: from an empirical perspective, it has not been 
able to limit criminalization and has also resulted in expanding the scope of 
criminal law;46 from a normative perspective, the harm principle is unable 
to limit criminalization because it does not articulate the substantive content 
of its normative component. However, little has been offered by scholars to 
address these challenges, and the search for the missing component to 
supplement the harm principle has not yet been successful.  
While the Lawrence decision is typically viewed as a victory for those 
who support the de-criminalization of consensual conducts and reject legal 
moralism as a justification for criminalization, little attention has been 
given to the practical ramifications of the harm principle as endorsed by the 
decision.47 Despite what seemed to be a revolutionary holding, fueled by 
Justice Scalia’s “parade of horribles” dissent and his slippery-slope style 
warning that Lawrence signals the end of all morals statutes, Lawrence has 
surprisingly not resulted in far-reaching practical implications on the scope 
of criminal law. 48  While Lawrence is understood to be a landmark 
constitutional law decision, its effects on both the criminal law and the 
criminalization of victimless crimes have been rather modest.49  
While the harm principle is deeply rooted in a libertarian view, 
focusing on individuals’ rights to liberty, autonomy, and privacy, an 
unintended consequence of the alleged “victory” of the harm principle has 
been its excessive use to justify a broad range of criminal bans, resulting in 
an illiberal criminal law.50 Today, the harm principle serves not only to 
justify criminal regulation, but also to expand it—a surprising consequence 
given that the harm principle was initially viewed as a mechanism to limit 
                                                
 46.  See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999). 
 47.  See Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free 
Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 503, 503-04 (2004) (characterizing the Lawrence Court’s adoption of the 
harm principle as “the coup de grâce to legal moralism administered after a prolonged, 
brutish, tedious, and debilitating struggle against liberal legalism in its various criminal law 
representations”). 
 48.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 49.  See Strader, supra note 21, at 95-97. 
 50.  See Steven D. Smith, Is The Harm Principle Illiberal?, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 14 
(2006). 
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criminal law by rejecting moral arguments that supported criminalization to 
uphold morality per se.51 The expansive reading of the harm principle, 
however, has resulted in turning an ostensibly liberal idea into a 
conservative concept, which is too readily able to generate harm arguments 
to justify expansive prohibitions that previously had only moralism 
rationales.52 Scholars have concluded that “[t]he concept of ‘harm’ itself so 
eludes definition that it has been employed to describe all manner of 
conduct with no tangible or emotional injury, no victim, and no significant 
risk creation.”53  
B.  Victimless Crimes After Lawrence v. Texas 
Applying the harm principle in the context of victimless crimes further 
sharpens its empirical failure, as the justifications for the continued 
criminalization of victimless crimes appear dubious after Lawrence v. 
Texas. Recall, that the category of victimless crimes includes not only 
activities where individuals inflict only harm to themselves—such as 
gambling and the use of recreational drugs—but also consensual activities 
that take place between two or more adults, inflicting only harm to those 
who engage in them but not on third parties—such as prostitution, 
pornography, polygamy, incest, and sadomasochism.54 
In theory, adopting the Millian harm principle should have resulted in 
the decriminalization of all forms of victimless crimes. Under the Lawrence 
rationale, when individuals are engaging in consensual activities, they 
ought to enjoy a right to choose to engage in those activities, even if they 
inflict harm upon themselves or upon other consenting participants. The 
right to consent to harm, either self-inflicted or at the hands of other 
participants, is grounded in the fundamental right to autonomy, liberty, and, 
most importantly, human dignity.55 A libertarian approach requires the 
government to refrain from intervening in individuals’ free choices, 
including choices that the government may view as harmful, injurious, or 
simply “bad”.56 In addition, the government needs a specific justification to 
restrict an individual’s right to choose to engage in activities that may harm 
that individual in some way.57 
                                                
 51.  See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Thinking Criminal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2419, 
2421-22 (2007). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See Brown, supra note 9, at 971. 
 54.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 400 (8th ed. 1999). 
 55.  See Dubber, supra note 6, at 568. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values 
and the Victim’s State of Mind, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 759, 770-71 (2000) (discussing different 
aspects of the notion of dignity and its relation to the notion of autonomy). 
 56.  See Dubber, supra note 6, at 543. 
 57.  Id. at 536. 
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However, the Court’s decision in Lawrence has not resulted in a 
comprehensive overhaul of all victimless crimes, nor has it had much 
practical effect on substantive criminal law.58 To name a few examples: 
prostitution is still criminalized in all states (except several counties in 
Nevada where legalized brothels are closely regulated);59 the laws in all 
jurisdictions refuse to recognize consent as a defense to bodily injury;60 
polygamy is still a criminal offense in all states; and while pornography is 
heavily regulated but legal, the law still criminalizes obscenity, based on its 
offensiveness to certain segments of society. 61  The continued 
criminalization of these offenses sharpens the question of consent to harm: 
if one individual authorizes another to inflict harm on him while engaging 
in mutually consensual activities, such as sadomasochism practices, why 
should the state intervene in these autonomous choices by criminalizing 
these conducts? 
Commentators have long grappled with the legal significance of 
consent to harm and its precise role in criminal cases involving the 
infliction of severe harm to others62: Vera Bergelson, for example, contends 
that consent should always be at least a partial defense in cases involving 
conducts which result in physical harm to another individual.63 However, 
she also argues that consent alone does not suffice to justify bodily harm 
and that to qualify as a full defense, the defendant must also establish that 
the consensual harmful act either did not significantly set back the victim’s 
interests or did not disregard the victim’s dignity.64 
But not all victimless crimes involve the question of consent to harm, 
since some vices consist of individuals inflicting harm only upon 
themselves. Indeed, the most notable example concerning the continued 
criminalization of victimless crimes is the use and possession of 
recreational drugs. Recent years have seen a push in the direction of 
                                                
 58.  See generally Strader, supra note 21, at 42 (suggesting that “[d]espite Lawrence’s 
purported landmark status and the vast amount of commentary that the decision has 
produced, the case has had remarkably little impact on substantive criminal law as applied 
by lower federal courts and state courts”).  
 59.  See Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep the Secrets from the Federal 
Government?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 124 (2012). 
 60.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2) (only allowing consent as a defense to 
physical harm when the injury is not serious, when the injury is a reasonably foreseeable 
result of “participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport,” and when “the 
consent establishes justification for the conduct under Article 3 of the Code”).  
 61.  Strader, supra note 21, at 102-04. 
 62.  See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 6, at 569; Paul Roberts, Philosophy, Feinberg, 
Codification, and Consent: A Progress Report on English Experiences of Criminal Law 
Reform, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 173, 252-53 (2001).   
 63.  See Bergelson, supra note 13, at 170. 
 64.  Id. 
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decriminalizing both use and possession for self-use of marijuana.65 This 
change has come about in the wake of several developments: first, Colorado 
and Washington state have recently become the first states that legalized the 
possession of up to one ounce of marijuana for adults twenty-one years and 
older;66 second, many states now legalize the use of medical marijuana with 
a doctor’s recommendation;67 third, in many jurisdictions, possession and 
use of small quantities of marijuana is no longer a crime but rather a 
misdemeanor, punishable by a fine;68 and lastly, many jurisdictions have 
significantly relaxed their law enforcement practices concerning self-use 
and possession of marijuana, making it the lowest enforcement priority.69 
However, despite these winds of change, the federal government and 
the majority of states still make possession of marijuana a criminal offense 
punishable by imprisonment.70 Moreover, every year, federal and state drug 
laws result in the arrest of more than 700,000 Americans for marijuana 
possession alone.71 These statistics are particularly surprising in light of the 
fact that more than 100 million Americans use marijuana, thus potentially 
turning all of them into criminals.72  
The continued criminalization of all types of drugs, including those 
whose effects are scientifically proven to be similar to their legal 
counterparts, alcohol and tobacco, is in direct conflict with the harm 
principle.73 Furthermore, criminalizing possession and use of small amounts 
of marijuana is not only unjustified under the utilitarian harm principle, but 
also antithetical to fundamental libertarian values such as autonomy, 
liberty, and privacy.74 This Article revisits this problem in Part IV, applying 
a proposal to limit the overcriminalization of victimless crimes.  
                                                
 65.  Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Liberty Lost: The Moral Case for Marijuana Law 
Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 279, 298 (2010). 
 66.  See Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions 
Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P15(describing the legal changes in Washington and 
Colorado). 
 67.  See Ekow N. Yankah, A Paradox in Overcriminalization, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 
1, 6 (2011) (describing medical marijuana reforms). 
 68.  Id. at 7-8 (discussing the growing trend in many jurisdictions towards 
decriminalization of use and possession of marijuana). 
 69.  Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 65, at 297-98. 
 70.  Id. at 279. 
 71.  Id. at 280. 
 72.  Id. at 298. 
 73.  See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, No Rational Basis: The Pragmatic Case for 
Marijuana Law Reform, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 43 (2009). 
 74.  See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 65. 
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C.  The Harm Principle’s Normative Failure  
The harm principle is unable to limit the scope of criminalization 
because its definition lacks some essential normative components.75 Under 
the harm principle, the main trend has been to demoralize criminal law both 
in regard to criminalization and to punishment. 76  According to this 
utilitarian view, crime is just one source of harm among many other 
harmful activities, therefore diminishing the significance of the moral 
component in crime and blurring the distinction between criminal law and 
other areas of law.77 While the harm principle ostensibly ought to play an 
important role in every criminalization decision in a post-Lawrence era, 
criminal law theorists have long recognized that this principle, in itself, is 
insufficient to justify criminal regulation.78 Furthermore, as harm arguments 
become broader and more speculative, evaluating these claims, and 
comparing between competing harms get more complicated. 
Acknowledging the limits of the harm principle to provide a comprehensive 
justification for criminalization, scholars concede that establishing the 
perpetrator’s guilt and justifying his punishment requires the adoption of an 
additional normative component, which stems from moral principles and 
philosophical theories of rights and wrongdoing.79 
Joel Feinberg offers one of the most comprehensive works on the limits 
of the harm principle in his four volume series on justifications for 
criminalization, contending that the harm principle consists of both a 
setback to interests as well as establishing the perpetrator’s wrongdoing.80 
However, a crucial question remains under Feinberg’s account: this theory 
calls for supplementing the harm principle with a separate theory of rights, 
namely, a theory that would provide substantive content to the wrongdoing 
element.81 Moreover, prominent criminal law scholars concede that modern 
criminal law is far from neutral and ought to encompass moral judgments 
and fundamental societal values, both of which are common to all 
societies.82 Furthermore, this normative moral dimension is not only an 
                                                
 75.  Id. at 281. 
 76.  Id. at 285. 
 77.  Id. at 284. 
 78.  Andrew Koppelman, Drug Policy and the Liberal Self, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 279, 
281 (2006). 
 79.  See FEINBERG, supra note 43, at 118. 
 80.  See id. 
 81.  HUSAK, supra note 4, at 71. 
 82.  See generally Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: 
Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1105 (2011) (arguing that the 
law depends on voluntary compliance, which is best attained by aligning law and popular 
shared moral intuitions of ordinary people).  
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inevitable component of any criminal law theory but also the distinctive 
feature that separates criminal law from civil law.  
Conceding that the harm principle in itself is unable to provide a 
sufficient justification for criminalization, several scholars consider some 
alternatives. Providing one example, Meir Dan-Cohen has proposed the 
adoption of a rights-based perspective that departs from the harm principle 
and focuses on human dignity as the key justification for criminalization.83 
Dan-Cohen contends that the main and distinctive purpose of criminal law 
is to uphold the equal moral worth of human beings.84 This type of proposal 
responds to the claim that one of utilitarianism’s main flaws is its failure to 
give adequate weight to the dignity of persons.85  
Another proposal is offered by Michael Moore, who contends that the 
harm principle is unable to explain why the criminal law punishes only 
some omissions and harmless wrongdoing on one hand, but refuses to 
punish harmful acts and other omissions that are not morally wrong on the 
other.86  The law punishes omissions because moral obligations require 
individuals to help; harmless wrongdoing justifies punishment because 
while nobody is actually harmed, the act is still morally wrong; and harmful 
acts that are not wrongful do not justify punishment because there is simply 
no culpable wrongdoing. 87  Rejecting the sole reliance on the harm 
principle, Moore contends that the focus of justified criminal legislation 
ought to be moral wrongdoing, not harms.88 Moore further argues that his 
modified version of legal moralism as justification for criminalization is 
compatible with liberal theories, in prohibiting the use of criminal law in 
cases of moral paternalism.89 
Douglas Husak advocates the adoption of the wrongdoing component 
as one of the internal limitations on criminalization, in addition to other 
constraints. These additional constraints include the nontrivial harm 
requirement, the desert requirement—namely, that punishment is justified 
only when and to the extent it is deserved—and the burden of proof 
constraint, which holds that those who advocate the imposition of penal 
sanctions should carry a heavy burden of proof of justifying them.90 
                                                
 83.  See Dan-Cohen, supra note 51, at 2420 (suggesting that “the agenda of the 
criminal law” be viewed “in terms of a Kantian morality focused on the core value of human 
dignity”). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  See Koppelman, supra note 78, at 281. 
 86.  See MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 
649 (2010). 
 87.  Id. at 753. 
 88.  Id. at 659, 669. 
 89.  Id. at 792-94. 
 90.  See HUSAK, supra note 4, at 55, 82-83, 92-100 (elaborating on the four internal 
constraints that he identifies as limits on criminalization). 
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However, while Husak concedes that the wrongdoing component calls for 
adopting a separate moral theory of rights, his work does not provide such a 
supplemental theory, perhaps owing to the lack of consensus on what type 
of theory ought to be adopted.91  As a libertarian, Husak would have 
advocated a theory focusing on individuals’ free choices, liberty, and 
autonomy.92 However, with an extensive liberal theory having failed to 
promote instrumental change in criminal law and many forms of activities 
that interfere with individuals’ freedoms still criminalized, the wrongdoing 
component is unable to constrain overcriminalization. Arguably, the 
problem stems from the fact that scholars are unable to reach a consensus 
concerning the precise definition and content of injuries and criminal 
wrongdoing: while liberals focus on individual rights such as liberty and 
autonomy as long as there is no harm to third parties, conservatives would 
advocate a moral theory of rights that focuses on paternalistic justifications 
favoring the protection of individuals from their own choices on the 
grounds that they harm themselves. 
D.  The Unconstitutional Nature of Criminal Law 
Another potential mechanism that could be used to constrain 
overcriminalization is constitutional law: the doctrine of judicial review 
authorizes the judiciary to review both state legislative enactments as well 
as federal statutes, allowing federal judges to strike down legislation that is 
incompatible with the U.S Constitution.93 However, while constitutional 
law has successfully placed significant limits on criminal procedure, it has 
not played a significant role in the realm of substantive criminal law, 
leaving it almost completely beyond constitutional scrutiny.94  
Commentators have long noted that substantive criminal law is not 
constitutionalized, namely, that constitutional law places no constraints on 
the content of substantive criminal law.95 In his landmark paper, William 
Stuntz discusses three possible solutions to the problem of over-
criminalization: limiting prosecutorial discretion, ending legislative 
monopoly on crime definition, and constitutionalizing criminal law, which 
he favors.96 While more than a decade has passed since the publication of 
Stuntz’s work, courts have not developed significant constitutional 
doctrines for checking legislatures’ crime creation choices, and the law has 
                                                
 91.  Id. at 71. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See Dubber, supra note 6, at 530. 
 94.  See Bilionis, supra note 5. 
 95.  See, e.g., id. at 1271. 
 96.  See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 579. 
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still refused to take the path of constitutionalizing substantive criminal 
law.97  
In his recent book, 98  Douglas Husak proposes additional external 
constraints to limit overcriminalization, drawing on an existing 
constitutional doctrine of judicial review as a conceptual framework for 
regulating substantive criminal law.99 Since the right not to be punished is 
important but not fundamental, Husak’s theory adopts the doctrine of 
intermediate scrutiny, under which a legislature could criminalize activity 
only under three conditions: if the government interest in doing so is 
substantial, the prohibition directly advances that government interest, and 
the government's objective is no more extensive than necessary to achieve 
its purpose.100  
However, Husak concedes that, in the context of criminal law, courts 
are not institutionally competent to make substantive judgments that the 
doctrine itself requires, such as determining whether certain forms of 
conduct warrant criminal condemnation, whether noncriminal approaches 
are less restrictive than criminal laws, and whether particular statutes serve 
important expressive functions.101 Indeed, while at the theoretical level 
these constraints on criminal law are coherent and plausible, at the practical 
level they run into difficulties when substantive content is applied to them. 
The following section draws on existing proposals to limit the scope of 
substantive criminal law by turning to the concept of human dignity. 
II.  HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
A.  Debating Human Dignity’s Jurisprudential Role 
Human dignity is a unique concept in American jurisprudence; while it 
is not an enumerated constitutional right, many courts and commentators 
suggest that it is a fundamental value, underlying many other constitutional 
rights. 102  Moreover, in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
increasingly invoked this concept in a wide array of its constitutional 
decisions.103  
While the notion of human dignity has received increasing judicial and 
scholarly attention,104 American scholars sharply disagree over its role in 
                                                
 97.  See Brown, supra note 9. 
 98.  HUSAK, supra note 4, at 55, 82-83. 
 99.  Id. at 128-32. 
 100.  Id. at 128, 132. 
 101.  Id. at 130-31. 
 102.  See Parent, supra note 25, at 47, 71. 
 103.  See Henry, supra note 27, at 171. 
 104.  See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1108, 1118 (2011). 
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American constitutional jurisprudence.105 Various scholars focus on the 
central role of human dignity within the constitutional jurisprudence of 
fundamental rights, with several going so far as to hail it as one of the 
fundamental constitutional values in American jurisprudence.106 Noting that 
“human dignity . . . underlies our constitutional rights to privacy, liberty, 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure, protection against cruel 
and unusual punishment and other express rights and guarantees,” 107 
scholars further stress that human dignity is one of “those very great 
political values that define our constitutional morality.”108 Legal theorist 
Ronald Dworkin offers perhaps the most far-reaching approach to the role 
of human dignity in American jurisprudence, suggesting that “the principles 
of human dignity . . . are embodied in the Constitution and are now 
common ground in America.”109  
However, while human dignity is a crucial component in many moral 
theories, its precise meaning and application in American jurisprudence is 
not always agreed upon.110 Christopher McCrudden, for example, is wary of 
the term’s increasing popularity in constitutional discourse, strongly 
criticizing the use of this concept in the context of American constitutional 
law.111 McCrudden notes that what distinguishes this notion from similarly 
elusive concepts in American jurisprudences—such as liberty—is the fact 
that human dignity is not a part of the U.S. Constitution, raising doubts as 
to whether it actually plays a significant role in American law or carries any 
practical legal implications in American jurisprudence.112 Moreover, argues 
McCrudden, as human dignity is susceptible to strikingly different readings, 
it is unable to offer a workable legal standard and therefore should not be 
applicable in legal decisions and constitutional jurisprudence.113  
While human dignity is a murky theoretical concept, its increasing 
invocation by the U.S Supreme Court suggests that it cannot be ignored. 
Before turning to consider U.S. Supreme Court human dignity 
jurisprudence, it is important to understand the philosophical theories 
underlying the legal basis for human dignity. 
                                                
 105.  See Henry, supra note 27, at 175. 
 106.  See id.; Parent, supra note 25. 
 107.  See Maxine Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 753 (2006). 
 108.  See Parent, supra note 25, at 47, 71. 
 109.  See Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sep. 21, 
2006), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/sep/21/three-questions-
for-america/.  
 110.  See Henry, supra note 27, at 172. 
 111.  See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of 
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 712 (2008). 
 112.  See, e.g., id. at 695. 
 113.  See, e.g., id. at 706. 
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B.  Human Dignity in Philosophical Theories  
Philosophical theories concerning normative ethics have traditionally 
encompassed two competing traditions: deontology, which is based on the 
individual’s moral rights and obligations, 114  and consequentialism (or 
utilitarianism), which focuses on the consequences of actions and on 
evaluating which actions most contribute to human happiness. 115 
Deontology’s fundamental premise is that liberty, autonomy, and human 
dignity are basic rights, whose restriction requires special justifications.116 
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant is considered by many scholars to 
be the founder of the modern concept of human dignity.117 According to 
Kant, morality is based on a universal and impartial law of rationality, best 
captured in his famous Categorical Imperative, demanding that a person 
should “[a]ct in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but 
always at the same time as an end.”118 
Kant’s theory embodies the view that all human beings deserve to be 
treated as free, autonomous agents because they have the distinct capacity 
to adhere to moral reasoning and thought, which includes the ability to 
make rational choices regarding what is deeply valuable or worthy.119 Kant 
therefore contended that humanity, so far as it is capable of morality, is the 
only thing which has dignity, and that this capacity provides every person 
an intrinsic dignity that every other person must respect.120  
                                                
 114.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 468 (8th ed. 1999). See generally SHELLY KAGAN, 
NORMATIVE ETHICS 70-78 (1998) (discussing deontology’s basic tenets and noting that 
deontology is a way of thinking about morality that speaks in terms of moral rights and 
wrongs that are resistant to consequentialist considerations about what would produce the 
best outcome).  
 115.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (8th ed. 1999); see, e.g., Samuel Freeman, 
Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 313, 323 (1994) 
(noting that good consequences refer to social welfare as defined independently of any moral 
concepts or principles). 
 116.  See Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
271, 292 (2006) (noting that “[a]pplying Kantian principles to political philosophy, 
government should enact laws and policies that maximize individual autonomy and that 
respect the inherent dignity of all people”). 
 117.  See, e.g., ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS 215 (2008); Peter Branden Bayer, 
Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the Constitution is a “Suicide Pact,” 20 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 287, 348-51 (2011); McCrudden, supra note 111, at 659. 
 118.  See Immanuel Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals § 4:439, in 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 41, 88 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1785). 
 119.  See R. George Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves: The Legal 
Implications of a Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 274 (2002). 
 120.  IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41 (James W. 
Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785); see also WOOD, supra note 117, at 
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According to Kant, autonomy is the basis for human dignity, and that 
free will consists of the ability of humans to choose their goals or actions, 
together with the capacity to distinguish good actions (respectful of others’ 
rights) from bad ones (disrespectful of others’ rights).121 Kant argues that 
“the dignity of humanity consists…in the capacity to give universal law.”122 
In other words, individuals’ human dignity derives from the capacity for 
autonomous choices. Moreover, according to Kant, dignity is “absolute 
inner worth,” unconditional and incomparable, because rational beings’ 
autonomy is unconditional, and therefore respect must be given to these 
human beings unconditionally.123 
The notion of human dignity entails both the right to demand dignity 
and the state’s concomitant duty to respect an individual’s dignity.124 The 
fundamental notion of autonomy therefore grounds both the dignity of 
human beings and their obligations to respect the dignity of others.125 The 
notions of respect and dignity are therefore the essence of the Kantian 
approach: every human being both owes and is owed respect to others.126 
Two of the most important American political and moral thinkers 
follow Kantian views on autonomy and dignity, representing contemporary 
views on human dignity under a deontological theory. John Rawls offers a 
reinterpretation of Kant’s conception of personal autonomy and the 
categorical imperative, suggesting that autonomy gives rise to obligations 
of respect.127 In his “Principles of Justice,” Rawls describes the Liberty 
Principle as establishing equal basic liberties for all citizens, such as 
freedoms of conscience, association, and expression, as well as democratic 
rights.128 These basic liberties have a special status and are prioritized over 
other rights.129  
Legal theorist Ronald Dworkin also embraces Kantian approaches, 
suggesting that human dignity represents the ideology of both human rights 
and liberal constitutionalism.130 Under this account, dignity and equality are 
                                                                                                             
94. 
 121.  KANT, supra note 120, at 44-45; see also David G. Owen, Expectations in Tort, 43 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1287, 1287 (2011). 
 122.  See Kant, supra note 118, § 4:412, at 65-66, § 4:441, at 89-90, § 4:429, at 79-80; 
see also Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, In Defense of Autonomy: An Ethic of Care, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 548 (2008). 
 123.  Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals §§ 6:222, 6:435, in PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 557-58 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1797). 
 124.  See Waldron, supra note 104, at 1110-11. 
 125.  McCrudden, supra note 111, at 659-60. 
 126.  See id. at 665. 
 127.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 519 (1971). 
 128.  Id. at 60-61. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 24-26 (1996) (discussing the conditions 
of moral membership in a political community). 
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viewed as the primary moral justifications for all legal rights, and human 
dignity is one type of individual human right.131 Most importantly, Dworkin 
is perhaps the first American theorist to link human dignity with the U.S. 
Constitution,132 viewing equality and dignity as the primary basis for a 
moral reading of the American Constitution.133  
Traditionally, the contrasting philosophical approach to liberal Kantian 
theories has been consequentialism or utilitarianism, which focuses on 
promoting overall social welfare rather than an individual’s fundamental 
rights. 134  According to consequentialism, certain circumstances justify 
violating human dignity if doing so preserves more dignity than the dignity 
that was violated.135 Deterrence-based theories of punishment hold that 
rational actions must aim at advancing the overall well-being of society, 
which is the only value and social good a society ought to promote, often at 
the expense of fairness to the individual.136 Naturally, the notion of human 
dignity does not play a significant role under such theories, where society’s 
dignity may outweigh an individual’s right to dignity.  
Another popular moral theory, communitarian virtue ethics, stands in 
sharp contrast both to Kantian views and consequentialist theories.137 The 
foundational roots of virtue ethics can be traced to the work of the Greek 
philosopher Aristotle,138 who developed the idea that human flourishing 
consists in the exercise of certain virtues and is the ultimate goal for all 
persons. 139  Virtue ethics emphasizes moral character, in contrast to 
deontology, which focuses on duties or rules, and utilitarianism, which 
                                                
 131.  See id. at 1-38. 
 132.  See id. at 24, 26.  
 133.  See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-74 (1977). 
 134.  Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Concept of 
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 208 (2003). 
 135.  Id. at 208-09. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  See NOEL STEWART, ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 54 
(2009); see also PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY 8-14 (1978); MARY GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 1-17 (1991); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN 
MORAL THEORY 239 (1982); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1-
17 (1982); Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in 13 
MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 32, 33 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1988); Sherman J. 
Clark, Law as Communitarian Virtue Ethics, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 757 (2005). 
 138.  See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.A.K. Thomson trans., 1976) (n.d.); 
ROGER CRISP & MICHAEL SLOTE, INTRODUCTION TO VIRTUE ETHICS 1, 2 (Roger Crisp & 
Michael Slote eds., 1997); see also ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 8 (1999). 
 139.  See Ekow N. Yankah, Virtue’s Domain, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167, 1168-69 
(2009). 
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focuses on consequences of action.140 Virtue ethics focuses on what we 
should do to be “right” rather than how we should be to be happy.141 
Virtue ethics theory is closely linked to the notion of human dignity. 
For example, Mary Ann Glendon offers arguments rooted in the importance 
of human dignity to justify a policy imperative that addresses injustices 
against the poor.142 Until recently, the vast majority of literature on virtue 
ethics did not examine the role of community in the construction of 
character or the connection between character and law.143 Rather, as a 
philosophical moral theory, the natural focus of virtue ethics has been on 
personal virtue rather than a virtuous society.144 
However, scholars have recently started to identify connections among 
virtue ethics, philosophy, and law.145 While virtue ethics jurisprudence 
examines how the law can help make virtuous individuals, it also has 
implications for the proper ends of legislation: if the purpose of law is to 
make citizens virtuous, how does it affect the content of the laws?146 There 
have been several endeavors to apply virtue ethics to the law.147 Kyron 
Huigens, for example, has suggested that virtue ethics might provide a way 
of thinking about questions of criminal responsibility.148 As well, Huigens 
suggests that the purpose of law is “to promote the greater good of 
humanity,” and “[t]he criminal law serves that end by promoting virtue . . . 
by inquiring into the quality of practical judgment displayed by the accused 
in his actions.” 149  What grounds liability is the offender's “faulty 
reasoning,” and what the criminal law “condemns” is “not just harm, but 
the lack of judgment that results in harm.”150 
Some scholars suggest that a commitment to virtue is more compatible 
with communitarian approaches than with liberal autonomy-based 
                                                
 140.  See Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 9-
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considerations. 151  Sherman Clark, for example, suggests incorporating 
virtue ethics theory into law by acknowledging that the central aim of law is 
happiness for the people governed by it.152 He further argues that promoting 
communitarian character is the route to achieve this well-being.153 As such, 
Clark contends that legal discourse ought to examine the connection 
between law and public character and the ways in which law plays a role in 
the construction of community identity. 154  While communities should 
develop character traits in keeping with their own history and culture, there 
will be circumstances under which they will need to cultivate other traits 
necessary for their well-being.155 
Other theorists have argued that virtue ethics is also compatible with 
liberalism.156 Martha Nussbaum offers another version of applying a virtue-
based theory to the legal context, relying on the concept of human dignity 
to develop a theory of social justice, which is based on the concept of 
capabilities approach.157 Under Nussbaum’s view, every person possesses 
full and equal human dignity—unless in a permanent vegetative condition 
or otherwise cut off from striving and sentience.158 A life worthy of human 
dignity, Nussbaum contends, requires a minimum of certain central 
capabilities.159 She then proposes a list of ten components essential for 
minimal social justice, including life, bodily health, and bodily integrity.160  
But what does the above philosophical controversy have to do with 
human dignity jurisprudence as developed in judicial opinions? The 
following section demonstrates that these contrasting philosophical theories 
are closely linked to the various ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
invokes the notion of human dignity.  
C.  Human Dignity in the U.S. Supreme Court  
The U.S. Supreme Court has at times conceived both liberty and 
communitarian virtue as forms of dignity.161 These different accounts create 
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a fundamental distinction between using human dignity to promote 
individual autonomy and the communitarian account of human dignity as 
representing a virtuous society.  
D.  Liberty as Dignity  
In an important line of cases, the Court has invoked the concept of 
dignity to promote individualistic approaches, supporting individuals’ rights 
to exercise autonomous choices in matters pertaining to their self-
fulfillment and self-realization. 162  One notable example concerns the 
reproductive or abortion cases: the Court first relied on the concept of 
liberty as dignity to protect a woman’s autonomous choice to have an 
abortion by striking down certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion 
Control Act, in its 1986 decision in Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 163  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Blackmun stated that  
[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or 
more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's 
decision—with the guidance of her physician and within the limits 
specified in Roe—whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make 
that choice freely is fundamental.164  
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the 
Court broadened its concept of human dignity to embody an individual’s 
autonomous choice, self-fulfillment, and self-realization. 165  In the oft-
quoted “mystery of life” passage, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, 
stated that: 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, 
and education. Our cases recognize “the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
                                                                                                             
747 (1986) (overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
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fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget 
a child.” Our precedents “have respected the private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter.” These matters, involving the most intimate 
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes 
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.166  
While the Court’s concept of human dignity in Thornburgh 
encompassed the view that a woman’s right to abortion is as important and 
constitutionally protected as other “personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationship, child rearing and 
education,” the Casey Court expanded its constitutional protection to 
additional autonomous choices central to the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, self-fulfillment, self-realization, and the “mystery of 
life.”167  
A second line of cases concerns sexual choices, particularly same-sex 
relationships, as best illustrated in the Court’s landmark decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas.168 Citing the above “mystery of life” passage from 
Casey, the Lawrence Court invoked the concept of liberty as dignity to 
strike down Texas’s anti-sodomy law as violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s right to due process,169 stating that “adults may choose to 
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own 
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons . . . . The liberty 
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make 
this choice.”170 Commentators have noted that the Lawrence decision “may 
presage a new jurisprudence” that places constitutional limits on a state’s 
power to criminalize any activity that is “somehow connected with efforts 
to ‘define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life.’”171  
Lawrence’s open-ended language may have far-reaching implications: 
the Court’s invocation of the concept of liberty as dignity closely follows 
Kantian approaches by acknowledging that human dignity is a crucial 
feature of human life. Consequently, a broad reading of the Lawrence 
holding suggests that under the Fourteenth Amendment, the government 
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may not criminalize any conduct that interferes with an individual’s 
“choices central to personal dignity,” thereby making any criminal law that 
unjustifiably interferes with such choices subject to constitutional scrutiny.  
Moreover, the crux of the Lawrence decision is the adoption of the 
harm principle, namely, harm to third parties, as the main justification for 
exercising the state’s power to limit individuals’ autonomous choices.172 
Another direct implication of the Court’s concept of liberty as dignity is its 
focus on dignity as an individualistic right, rather than a social one. Most 
importantly, it is individual people, as opposed to states, societies or 
institutions, who are entitled to enjoy the protection of the fundamental 
value of human dignity.  
Adopting the concept of liberty as dignity is contingent on the capacity 
for making autonomous choices, which excludes young children and 
mentally incapacitated individuals, for example. If, in addition, drug addicts 
are also deemed not to have the capacity to make autonomous choices to 
harm themselves, criminal prohibitions that protect individuals with 
impaired capacity from their own harmful choices would need to be upheld 
simply because such persons lack the preliminary conditions for exercising 
autonomous choices. Moreover, if the Court went even further and 
extended its constitutional protection to additional types of autonomous 
choices, these could include other forms of exercising one’s right to dignity 
and liberty, such as physician-assisted suicide and the use of recreational 
drugs.  
A broad reading of Lawrence suggests that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the government may not criminalize any conduct that 
interferes with individuals’ “choices central to personal dignity.”173 Why, 
then, is the Court willing to adopt a liberal approach supporting individuals’ 
rights to freedom and autonomous choices in matters pertaining to 
reproductive and sexual choices, but not in other contexts, such as drugs? 
One explanation concerns the harm principle: while reproductive and 
sexual choices are inherently harmless to third parties, other personal life 
choices, for example, using recreational drugs, are potentially harmful to 
others; thus, the latter case justifies criminalization based on a utilitarian 
account while the former does not. In addition, reproductive and sexual 
choices are a crucial component of self-fulfillment and self-realization, 
while the use of recreational drugs is not.174 An argument can be made that 
recreational drug use does not implicate fundamental issues where societal 
perceptions evolve over time or require the protection of a socially 
disadvantaged minority group. In sum, Lawrence’s open-ended “mystery of 
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life” passage remains an unsolved mystery, as the precise scope and contour 
of the Court’s liberty as dignity concept still remains to be seen.  
E.  Communitarian Virtue as Dignity 
A contrasting concept of human dignity invoked by the U.S Supreme 
Court is closely related to the philosophical theory of virtue ethics. In a 
series of decisions, the Court has invoked the concept of communitarian 
virtue as dignity to advance its views on an American society that is 
civilized, decent, and virtuous.175 Taken together, these cases suggest that 
there are some fundamental standards of decency that command the 
government’s protection of the dignity of individuals, and they are best 
captured in the notion of communitarian virtue. This line of cases is most 
notable in three main contexts: the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, particularly in the death penalty and prisoners’ rights cases; 
the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; and its abortion 
jurisprudence.176 
F.  Human Dignity and the Death Penalty  
A communitarian virtue account of human dignity is particularly 
prominent in the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause. Chief Justice Warren’s 1958 decision in 
Trop v. Dulles stressed that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man,” and the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment “draw[s] its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society,” emphasizing that these standards embody those that currently 
prevail in society.177 
While the death penalty is not categorically unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment, the Court significantly confined the types of situations 
in which this unique punishment can be imposed. The Court’s limiting 
principle states that the death penalty must “be limited to those offenders 
who commit “a narrow category of the most serious crimes” and whose 
extreme culpability makes them “the most deserving of execution.”178 The 
Court applied this limiting principle in a trilogy of Eighth Amendment 
cases, in which it held that the death penalty is unconstitutional in cases 
involving the mentally retarded,179 juveniles,180 and rapists.181 For juveniles 
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and the mentally retarded, the Court held that the death penalty violates the 
Eighth Amendment because the offender has a diminished personal 
responsibility for the crime.182 In cases of rape, the Court relied on the 
consensus against imposing the death penalty for child rape and on the 
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society,” which required that the use of the death penalty be restricted to 
cases resulting in death.183 
The notion of human dignity plays a key role in the Court’s restriction 
of the death penalty in these specific categories of cases. In Roper v. 
Simmons, Justice Kennedy stressed that human dignity lies at the 
foundation of the Eighth Amendment and elevated the value of human 
dignity to the level of an intrinsic constitutional value.184 Moreover, he 
argued that the Constitution rests upon “innovative principles original to the 
American experience, such as . . . specific guarantees for the accused in 
criminal cases; and broad provisions to secure individual freedom and 
preserve human dignity” and that “[t]hese doctrines and guarantees are 
central to the American experience and remain essential to [Americans’] 
self-definition and national identity.”185 In Kennedy v. Louisiana, Justice 
Kennedy stressed that “[e]volving standards of decency must embrace and 
express respect for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of 
criminals must conform to that rule.”186 In grounding the value of human 
dignity as a general constitutional right, along with individual freedom 
rights, Justice Kennedy took an important step in the direction of 
incorporating the value of human dignity into the Constitution itself, 
making it a fundamental value that underlies other constitutional rights, 
such as defendants’ criminal procedure guarantees.  
Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman v. Georgia also emphasizes 
the value of human dignity as grounded in the constitutional prohibition of 
“cruel and unusual punishment.”187 Justice Brennan notes that the Clause 
“prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments.”188 The 
State, he adds, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for 
their intrinsic worth as human beings; “[a] punishment is ‘cruel and 
unusual,’ therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.”189 Brennan 
further notes that “the primary principle is that a punishment must not be so 
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severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings,” and that the 
extreme severity of a punishment makes it degrading to the dignity of 
human beings beyond the presence of pain, such as punishments that inflict 
torture.190 
G.  Human Dignity and Prisoners’ Rights 
In a line of cases involving prisoners’ rights, the U.S. Supreme Court 
also relies on the value of human dignity to hold certain prison practices 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. In Hope v. Pelzer, the Court 
held unconstitutional a form of punishment that included handcuffing an 
inmate to a hitching post for seven hours in the sun without access to a 
bathroom.191 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, contends that several 
forms of corporal punishment violate the Eighth Amendment and offend 
contemporary concepts of decency and human dignity.192  Citing Chief 
Justice Warren’s famous quote from Trop v. Dulles, that the “basic concept 
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of 
man,”193 Justice Stevens holds that hitching a prisoner to a post for an 
extended period of time in a position that was painful, under circumstances 
that were both degrading and dangerous, was a way of treatment 
“antithetical to human dignity,” and that using such a form of punishment 
to discipline a disruptive prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment.194  
A recent pronunciation of the Court’s view of human dignity as 
embodying the value of communitarian virtue is demonstrated in the 2011 
Brown v. Plata decision. The landmark decision stemmed from two class 
action lawsuits concerning overcrowded prisons in California: the Plata 
class action, alleging unconstitutional failure to provide adequate medical 
care, and the Coleman class action, alleging inadequate mental health 
care.195 In Coleman v. Schwarzenegger a three-judge court issued a release 
order of prisoners over California’s objection; Justice Kennedy 
subsequently upheld the order, stressing the pivotal role human dignity 
plays in securing the fundamental human rights of inmates.196 He noted that 
“prisoners may be deprived of rights that are fundamental to liberty, [but 
they] retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons . . . [that] 
animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
                                                
 190.  Id. at 271. 
 191.  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 
 192.  Id. at 737 (quoting Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
 193.  Id. at 738 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)). 
 194.  Id. at 745. 
 195.  See Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 
90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 610 (2012). 
 196.  Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922 (2011). 
2012] BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL 320 
 
 320 
punishment.” 197  When a state facility deprives its citizens of basic 
sustenance, be it food or medical care, it acts in a manner “incompatible 
with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society.”198  
In the Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, involving the 
constitutionality of the detention of material witnesses in terrorism 
investigations, Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, detailing in 
pertinent part:  
Ostensibly held only to secure his testimony, al-Kidd was confined in 
three different detention centers during his 16 days’ incarceration, kept in 
high-security cells lit 24 hours a day, strip-searched and subjected to 
body-cavity inspections on more than one occasion, and handcuffed and 
shackled about his wrists, legs, and waist.199 
Referring to these as “brutal conditions of confinement,” Ginsburg 
further stressed that al-Kidd’s ordeal was “a grim reminder of the need to 
install safeguards against disrespect for human dignity, constraints that will 
control officialdom even in perilous times.”200 Invoking the communitarian 
concept of dignity in the “war on terrorism” further strengthens the 
Justices’ increasing reliance on this value. 
H.  Human Dignity and the Fourth Amendment 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also invoked human dignity as 
communitarian virtue in the context of searches and seizures that 
demonstrate a cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which 
shocks the conscience. In these cases the searches were particularly 
extreme, involving body searches to extract evidence of a crime. The 
“shocks the conscience” test was first adopted in the 1957 case of Rochin v. 
California, in which the Court held that the forced pumping of a suspect’s 
stomach was enough to offend Due Process as conduct that “shocks the 
conscience” and violates the “decencies of civilized conduct.” 201  The 
significance of the Rochin decision lies in recognizing the individual's 
interest in securing his right to human dignity by holding the search and 
seizure unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.202 
Police conduct that “shocks the conscience” has led to a series of 
similar claims by defendants who argued that law enforcement’s search and 
seizure practices violated the Due Process Clause based on that 
                                                
 197.  Id. at 1928. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2089 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).  
 202.  See id. at 174. 
2012] BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL 321 
 
 321 
characterization. In Schmerber v. California the Court noted that “[t]he 
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy 
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”203  The Court 
further identified a list of factors that create a balancing test between the 
individual’s rights to privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity, and the 
government’s interest in obtaining evidence.204 Based on this balancing test, 
the Court ruled that taking a blood sample from an injured and intoxicated 
arrestee over his objection violated neither the Fourth nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment.205 In contrast, in Winston v. Lee the Court refused to authorize 
surgery to remove a bullet from a suspect’s body because it involved “an 
‘extensive’ intrusion on respondent’s personal privacy and bodily 
integrity,” and the state’s interest in obtaining the bullet was not high 
enough to justify such an invasion.206 The extent of intrusion upon the 
individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity is 
therefore an important factor in this balancing test. 
I.  A Balancing Test: Reconciling Between Contrasting Concepts of Dignity  
While the Court has increasingly invoked human dignity in its 
constitutional law cases, it has failed to reach a consensus on the 
substantive meaning of this value, and has yet to invoke human dignity in 
the context of substantive criminal law.207 Similarly, commentators have 
neither agreed on the specific content of human dignity in criminal cases 
nor have elaborated on what understanding of the notion ought to prevail in 
cases where conflicting readings of human dignity may apply.208 Vera 
Bergelson, for example, advocates the use of the notion of human dignity as 
an additional component in criminalizing consensual conduct that inflicts 
harm to others, suggesting that conducts involving disregard of one’s 
dignity should be criminalized only when they are combined with a setback 
to interests protected by criminal law.209 Bergelson’s approach, however, 
leaves open the question of when, and under what circumstances, do certain 
behaviors in fact amount to disregard of an individual’s human dignity. 
Moreover, since Bergelson’s proposal rests upon the flawed premise that 
the notion of human dignity has only one agreed upon meaning, it does not 
address the need to balance between different readings of the notion of 
human dignity in cases where conflicting understandings may apply. 
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Therefore, this proposal further sharpens the need for developing a 
balancing test that would reconcile between potentially conflicting readings 
of human dignity. 
A close examination of the Court’s human dignity jurisprudence reveals 
that while the Court uses contrasting concepts of human dignity in different 
categories of cases, it remains unclear what type of balancing test it has 
ultimately adopted, and whether the same balancing test applies in all 
contexts.  
The Abortion Context 
Scholars have noted that when the individual concept of dignity as 
liberty and autonomy directly conflicts with a communitarian concept, a 
clash results in those cases in which societal perceptions strongly condemn 
conduct that an individual’s liberty and dignity demand be protected under 
the law.210 Judicial decisions have demonstrated that in contentious cases, 
the legal enforcement of societal standards and communitarian norms often 
outweigh individual free choices.211 These judicial decisions are grounded 
in an implicit balancing test adopted by the Court in specific cases, 
representing the Court’s view of the proper balance between an individual’s 
liberty rights and the societal norms and communitarian demands of a 
democratic society.212  
The abortion context provides the most notable pronunciation of the 
Court explicitly privileging communitarian values over individual liberty 
and autonomy. In the its 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 was 
constitutional.213 Whereas the Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey weighed a woman’s individual right to choose 
abortion against the state’s interest in respecting potential human life,214 the 
Carhart Court upheld the prohibition, avoiding this balancing test by 
categorically privileging a communitarian concept of human dignity, one 
that emphasizes a “decent society’s respect for the dignity of human life” 
over a woman’s liberty as dignity interests to choose abortion.215  The 
Carhart decision demonstrates clear judicial preference of dignity as 
communitarian virtue, trumping the competing concept of liberty and 
autonomy as dignity. 
While scholars have identified the contrasting concepts of human 
dignity invoked by the Court, they have yet to develop a balancing test such 
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as the one proposed in the remainder of this Article, examining which 
values and rights ought to override an individual’s exercise of autonomy. A 
broad reading of communitarian virtue as dignity would result in 
privileging a host of societal rights and values over individual liberties, 
consistent with the Court’s position in Carhart. However, a narrower 
reading of communitarian virtue would result in acknowledging only 
limited circumstances under which societal values outweigh individual 
choices and liberties. In contrast to the Carhart Court’s support for a broad 
reading of communitarian virtue as dignity, the alternative approach 
advocated here critiques this judicial preference by suggesting that it is 
incompatible with the fundamental values and rights underlining the U.S. 
Constitution. The following section lays out the guidelines for an 
appropriate balance between competing concepts of human dignity. 
III.  RULES TO LIMIT CRIMINALIZATION OF VICTIMLESS CRIMES 
Adopting a balancing test between conflicting concepts of human 
dignity requires articulating basic rules to serve as legislative guidelines for 
proposals to constrain the scope of certain categories of victimless crimes. 
These rules are applicable only in the context of victimless crimes, namely, 
after the activity in question is determined to be consensual, inflicting only 
harm to self. The principle underlying these rules is that the concept of 
human dignity merely supplements, rather than replaces, the harm principle, 
which is an essential existing constraint to criminalization. Harm to others 
is the paradigmatic example of the rights of others not to be harmed 
outweighing an individual’s right to exercise one’s liberties. The harm 
principle thus provides the main justification for the state’s restriction on 
individual liberty: when a conduct demonstrates a culpable and wrongful 
violation of another’s interests, the state is justified in criminalizing this 
conduct and imposing proportionate penalties. Put differently, individuals 
are entitled to exercise free autonomous choices regarding how to best live 
their lives, provided they do not inflict harm on other individuals.  
A.  Liberty as Dignity Generally Outweighs Communitarian Virtue 
Existing prohibitions on victimless crimes are grounded on the premise 
that individuals’ consent to harm themselves ought to be legally limited and 
that choice-based theory is not a sufficient condition to preclude criminal 
liability. 216  Under this prevailing view, the law upholds sanctions for 
various types of criminal offenses that inflict harms on consenting 
individuals, such as drug activity, gambling, and prostitution 
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prohibitions.217 This approach justifies using the government’s coercive 
power to criminalize activities in which consenting adults wish to engage, 
even though these activities inflict no harm on others, but only harm to self. 
This view, however, fails to grant sufficient protection to one’s right to 
liberty as dignity, a right that favors autonomous choices as individuals see 
fit. 
In contrast to this position, the proposed primary rule is that the concept 
of liberty as dignity generally outweighs the concept of dignity as 
communitarian virtue. This is the default rule that should apply as a 
legislative guideline while considering the constitutionality of any 
victimless crime. Moreover, any caveat that would supplement this general 
rule by articulating the limited circumstances under which another more 
important value outweighs this fundamental rule is only secondary in 
importance. 
The bold assertion that liberty as dignity generally outweighs the 
competing view of communitarian virtue as dignity begs the question: why? 
What are the justifications for privileging one concept of dignity over 
another? One answer rests with a basic premise underlying a liberal 
democratic government: a state needs special justifications to inflict 
punishment on individuals because the criminal law infringes on 
individuals’ fundamental freedoms and liberty interests and only culpable, 
wrongful harms on others trumps the right to enjoy these liberties, 
providing good reasons for the state to interfere with those liberties by 
imposing criminal penalties. 218  A related consideration supporting the 
aforementioned rule is the understanding that criminal law is a stringent 
weapon to be used only as a last resort. In other words, an alternative means 
of regulation ought to be considered when the objectives of a social policy 
may be achieved through methods less violative of individuals’ freedoms 
and liberties, and less drastic than the severe criminal sanction. 
Furthermore, favoring the concept of liberty as dignity over the 
competing concept of communitarian virtue as dignity also requires 
rejecting paternalism as a justification for criminalization. The 
aforementioned rule adopts John Stuart Mill’s famous articulation of the 
harm principle, stating that “the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is 
not a sufficient warrant.”219  
Mill’s statement further sharpens the role of paternalism in 
criminalizing consensual conducts, inflicting only harm to self but not to 
                                                
 217.  Id. at 197; see Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. 
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others. Paternalism is the intervention in an individual’s personal freedoms 
aimed at furthering his own good, as opposed to another’s well-being.220 
Scholars distinguish “hard” or “strong” from “soft” or “weak” paternalism, 
with the latter involving the restriction of an individual’s self-regarding 
conduct where the conduct is not substantially voluntary, and the former the 
restriction of an individual’s self-regarding conduct where the conduct is 
substantially voluntary.221 
Legal theorist Joel Feinberg categorically rejects the use of legal 
paternalism as a justification for criminalization, arguing that “a person’s 
right of self-determination, being sovereign, takes precedence even over his 
own good.”222 Feinberg rejects the alternative that “we must balance the 
person’s right against his good and weigh them,” contending that 
“paternalistic reasons never have any weight on the scales at all.”223 Other 
scholars assert that circumstances exist under which the need to protect 
individuals from harming themselves outweighs their autonomous freedom 
of choice to do so.224 For example, legal theorist R.A. Duff asserts that in 
certain circumstances it is legally justified to criminalize conduct that 
denies or radically fails to respect the humanity of those against or on 
whom they are perpetrated, even if this involves infringing on individuals’ 
autonomy, and even if such criminalization is not justified under the harm 
to others principle. 225  The role of legal paternalism carries practical 
implications that go beyond this theoretical debate; recall that current laws 
refuse to adopt Mill’s and Feinberg’s categorical rejection of legal 
paternalism. As described earlier, existing prohibitions on victimless 
conducts essentially rely on paternalistic justifications to uphold crimes that 
inflict no direct harm to others.226  
The above primary rule generally rejects paternalism as a justification 
for criminal prohibitions on victimless crimes. It holds that criminalization 
is unwarranted when individuals engage in consensual activities that inflict 
no harm on others, because such paternalism imposes majoritarian moral 
preferences and prevailing views concerning morality on society at large, 
therefore limiting individuals’ liberty to make their own choices about how 
best to live their lives.  
Another explanation supporting the proposed rule rests with grounding 
human dignity as a constitutional right, which is embodied in the U.S. 
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Constitution.227Adopting the paternalistic view that the state is obligated to 
intervene and restrict individual free choices in order to promote a 
sweeping view of communitarian norms and societal values is deeply 
antithetical to American constitutionalism. Arguably, one of the purposes of 
the U.S. Constitution is to secure individual personal rights, and human 
dignity is indeed such a right. The Declaration of Independence and Bill of 
Rights protect individual liberties of free choice on private matters by 
providing rights considered to be inviolable. These values and principles 
represent the core of the nation’s founding ideology, rejecting excessive 
government interference guided by majoritarian views that impose their 
moral beliefs on others.228 
Scholars have identified a list of constitutional rights enumerated in the 
U.S. Constitution.229 These include eight categories of constitutional rights, 
which the Supreme Court has invoked and which are part of the Bill of 
Rights: Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims; Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection claims; Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 
claims; Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims; Eighth Amendment 
cruel and unusual punishment claims; Fourteenth Amendment right to die 
claims; Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims; and First 
Amendment freedom of expression claims.230 
Privileging values such as liberty, freedom, individualism and 
autonomy over advancing societal or communitarian values and rights, the 
U.S. Constitution is not simply aimed at promoting communitarian values 
and societal interests. Rather, one of its important goals is securing personal 
individual rights. Commentators have long suggested that the notion of 
human dignity may play a significant part in the context of substantive 
criminal law.231 Markus Dubber, for example, argues that the government’s 
important role in protecting individual rights suggests an obligation towards 
its citizens to refrain from violating their right to human dignity.232 Dubber 
further contends that the government is unjustified in criminalizing an 
activity that infringes on individuals’ right to engage in behavior they see 
fit, provided that they do not harm anyone but themselves.233 Moreover, he 
posits that criminal harm is harm to a person, not a community, and that in 
light of this individual account of constitutional human rights, conduct that 
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qualifies as harmless cannot be criminalized in a constitutional regime of 
criminal law.234 
While privileging individual freedoms is typically associated with a 
Kantian liberal account, it is not necessarily inconsistent with a 
communitarian virtue account. Indeed, the pursuit of liberty, freedom, 
privacy and autonomy are fundamental American values, and the promise 
of “liberty and justice for all,” embodied in the Constitution, ought to result 
in privileging the right to consent to harming oneself.235 
Second, privileging the concept of liberty as dignity is justified on the 
grounds that it secures a negative right, while the competing concept of 
communitarian virtue as dignity promotes positive rights, which are 
generally foreign to the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the vast majority of 
rights enumerated in the Constitution are viewed as negative.236 A negative 
approach to human dignity requires the state to refrain from interfering 
with individuals’ exercise of their liberties and freedoms as long as 
individuals do not inflict harm on others by violating their interests.237 A 
constitutional regime grounded in a negative rights approach embraces a 
non-interference norm as the rule, requiring the government to abstain from 
intervening in individuals’ autonomy concerning their life choices (as 
opposed to requiring the government to intervene in promoting their well-
being).238 
In a recent empirical study, David Law and Mila Versteeg examined 
the globalization of constitutional law and compared constitutions around 
the world. The study identified several types of rights; the first list consists 
of “first-generation,” negative, civil/political rights.239 These include the 
right to life; the prohibitions of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention; 
freedom of movement; the right not to be expelled; Habeas corpus; the 
presumption of innocence; the right to appeal; the prohibition of ex post 
facto laws; the rights to public trial, to remain silent, to counsel, and to 
judicial review; and the prohibition of the death penalty.240 A second list 
consists of “second-generation,” positive, socioeconomic rights, including 
rights such as workers’ rights, rights to basic physical needs, the right to 
adequate standard of living, and rights to food, housing, water, health and 
education.241 A third list consists of “third-generation,” community/group 
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rights, such as rights for the elderly and handicapped, women’s rights, and 
rights for the family, children, victims of crimes, and prisoners.242 
Law and Versteeg suggest that constitutions can be divided across 
ideological lines. Some are characterized as libertarian, with a focus on 
limiting the government’s ability to deprive individuals of their physical 
freedom or to inflict bodily harm.243 This goal is achieved mainly through 
enshrining the judicial system with extensive authority to protect 
individuals’ liberties and freedoms. 244  Such constitutions represent a 
common law tradition of negative liberty and are grounded in some form of 
negative restriction on government power, creating a space of private 
autonomy and liberty with which the government may not interfere.245 
In sharp contrast, Law and Versteeg argue that the second type of 
constitutions is statist in nature, providing the state with a broad range of 
powers and positive responsibilities.246 These constitutions empower, or 
even obligate, the government to provide for the welfare of its citizens, 
adopting a far more active role for the state. Law and Versteeg further argue 
that while libertarian constitutions are premised on the goal of protecting 
individual liberties and freedoms against the tyranny of government, they 
rest on the premise that the government’s role is promoting the welfare of 
society as a whole.247 The comparative analysis also found that liberal 
constitutions are characteristic of democratic regimes with a common law 
tradition, while statist constitutions typically characterize undemocratic 
regimes with a civil law tradition.248 Such analysis further confirms that the 
U.S. Constitution represents the classical liberal Constitution, one that 
adopts negative restriction on state power, focusing on limiting or 
preventing actions against the individual by the state.249  
The above study supports the proposition that the concept of liberty as 
dignity should generally outweigh the competing concept of communitarian 
virtue as dignity. As a libertarian constitution, the U.S. Constitution 
explicitly privileges a negative approach that favors a non-interference duty 
on the government.250 Viewed through this lens, the U.S. Constitution is 
therefore more compatible with the concept of liberty and autonomy as 
dignity than with the contrasting view of communitarian virtue as dignity.  
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B.  Circumstances Where Communitarian Virtue Prevails 
Adopting a position that individuals are free to harm themselves under 
all circumstances is an unwarranted and overbroad legal change. Since no 
rule is absolute, clear boundaries must be set between individuals’ right to 
harm themselves and the state’s interest in limiting this right to promote 
fundamental societal values. The above primary rule, which rejects a “hard” 
form of communitarian virtue as dignity, leaves open the question of 
whether there ought to be some narrowly defined circumstances in which 
some “weaker” form of communitarian virtue as dignity outweighs 
individuals’ autonomous choices to engage in activities that harm 
themselves.  
The proposed secondary rule advocates a more nuanced account of 
communitarian values, one that recognizes the autonomous right of 
individuals to engage in consensual activities that may harm themselves, 
while at the same time adopting a legal boundary to limit such a choice 
where specific forms of risk are identified. This approach recognizes that 
there are competing values that directly clash with individuals’ right to 
enjoy fundamental liberties and exercise autonomous choices. It further 
recognizes that these competing values ought to be weighed and properly 
balanced against each other in specific categories of cases. This balancing 
act results in acknowledging that in certain circumstances, the law ought to 
intervene by placing some constraints on the lives of individuals whose 
choices might endanger their other fundamental rights.  
A balancing test that weighs individuals’ liberty rights against 
competing societal interests is a common component in many foreign 
constitutional schemes. 251  Constitutional balance typically adopts a 
proportionality review in which the main mechanism is a means-end 
analysis.252 For example, the Canadian balancing test provides that: 
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the 
objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on 
irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the 
objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective 
in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom 
in question. Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of 
the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or 
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freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient 
importance.”253 
The law must define under what narrow circumstances the right to 
autonomy and liberty should be balanced against competing fundamental 
rights. The circumstances under which communitarian virtue as dignity 
outweighs liberty as dignity include two types. The first type embodies 
situations in which the fundamental premise underlying the right to choose 
freely is absent, namely, when individuals lack the capacity for making free 
choices. These individuals mainly include minors and others whose 
capacity to choose is significantly impaired due to a physical or mental 
condition.254 The second type includes activities that significantly endanger 
inalienable rights, namely, the right to life and to bodily integrity, including 
protection against serious life-threatening or permanent injuries.255  
C.  Impaired Capacity to Exercise Autonomy  
One type of circumstance that justifies limiting individuals’ liberty is 
impaired capacity to exercise autonomous choices.256 Indeed, a prerequisite 
for exercising the right to liberty is the capacity to enjoy it. Recall that the 
Kantian ideas of liberty and dignity hold that individuals have the right to 
direct their own lives and a duty to respect others by not interfering with 
their choices.257 However, this vision is premised on the assumption that all 
individuals are free, equal, self-governing agents who make free choices 
and have the full capacity to do so.258  
In the case of children or incompetent individuals, however, the entire 
justification for this broad view of autonomy collapses. Those individuals 
with diminished capacities need the law’s protection from making choices 
that would harm them.259 While the purpose of liberalism is to allow 
individuals to exercise their moral and rational powers, it also requires that 
they possess those powers to some minimum degree.260 
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What, then, should the standard be for determining that specific 
individuals have impaired or diminished capacities to harm themselves? 
The answer depends on how broadly diminished capacity is defined, and on 
the stringency of the requirements for determining lack of capacity. In cases 
of drug addiction, it is unclear whether such addiction qualifies as a 
condition that completely deprives addicts of the capacity to exercise 
autonomous choices.261 The Article revisits this question in Section IV.  
C.  Endangering the Right to Life  
Another circumstance which warrants communitarian virtue as dignity 
outweighing liberty as dignity concerns activities that pose significant risks 
to life and bodily integrity. The right to life is one of the most fundamental 
constitutional rights, grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.262 
While negative rights, such as criminal procedure rights, require the 
government to refrain from taking certain forms of actions, the right to life 
and bodily integrity requires the government and its citizens both to refrain 
from taking actions that would significantly endanger one’s inalienable 
right to life and bodily integrity and to take affirmative actions to ensure 
that this right is properly secured.  
While the right to life is one of the most basic human rights, invoking it 
in American jurisprudence is often associated with the controversy over 
abortion,263 a rhetorical link that obfuscates the centrality of the latter as a 
fundamental general human right, irrespective and independent of the 
abortion context. Furthermore, this link often results in failing to consider 
the general implications of the right to life in other contexts, such as the 
criminal law. One notable example of the significance of the right to life is 
found in the context of international law, where this right is considered 
fundamental. 264  Numerous international documents, declarations, and 
treaties state that every person has an inalienable right to life, liberty, and 
privacy, which are crucial components of happiness and well-being.265 
The following discussion adopts the position that the right to life is a 
fundamental human right.266 The importance of the right to life makes it the 
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focal point of the proposed rule under which activities that significantly 
endanger the right to life and bodily integrity ought to remain criminally 
prohibited, even when engaged in by consenting individuals. The proposed 
balancing test requires privileging the state’s need to protect the right to life 
and bodily integrity over the competing value of liberty and dignity rights 
to exercise autonomous choices, thus drawing a reasonable boundary 
between justified and unjustified criminalization. While the primary rule 
prohibits the state from criminalizing consensual activities that would 
violate liberty and dignity rights, the secondary rule allows for only those 
activities that put the right to life or bodily integrity in significant danger to 
be criminalized. 
In light of this narrow caveat to the general right to liberty and 
autonomy, the proposed rule passes the proportionality review noted earlier. 
Indeed, the continued criminalization of life threatening activities is 
designed to secure the right to life and bodily integrity. Since 
criminalization is confined only to activities that risk this right, the rules 
preserve the right to liberty and offer a proportionality between the effects 
of criminalization and the fundamental right to life. Moreover, the 
government’s requirement to protect the right to life and bodily integrity 
relies on a “softer” or “weaker” version of communitarian virtue as dignity. 
As every civilized society cherishes the value of human life, it is required to 
uphold it. This rationale provides the justification for society’s coercive 
intervention, in the form of criminal regulation, to prevent individuals from 
engaging in dangerous activities that risk the right to life and bodily 
integrity.  
D.  Distinguishing Between Different Types of Dangerous Activities 
One potential critique of the proposed rules is that they are unable to 
draw clear conceptual boundaries between illegal and permissible types of 
activities that endanger the right to life and bodily integrity. Given the 
range of risky activities, which endanger lives but are perfectly legal, why 
should the law selectively criminalize certain of these activities while 
allowing other equally dangerous ones? 
Answering this question rests on capturing the fundamental differences 
between permissible and criminally risky activities. One possible 
distinction is that prohibited activities are more dangerous than their legal 
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counterparts.267 Under this reasoning, the principle of autonomy protects the 
right to engage in dangerous activities unless the risk exceeds a certain 
threshold, at which point the protection afforded by the principle of 
autonomy is outweighed by the need to prevent individuals from harming 
themselves.268 Take, for example, the ancient practice of gladiators fighting 
to the death. The main purpose of the game—killing the opponent—is what 
justifies the prohibition on such fights. In contrast, while harm is also likely 
to occur in sports such as boxing, harm is simply incidental to the game, 
which accounts for its legality. One drawback to this distinction is that it 
requires the adoption of a test to determine how to define this threshold of 
risk as well as which risky activities exceed that threshold. 
Another factor that distinguishes between different types of dangerous 
activities is the relative importance of the activity in question.269 Ostensibly, 
important risky activities deserve the protection of autonomy while 
unimportant ones do not. For example, engaging in competitive sports is 
significant to peoples’ lives, and thus ought to be protected by autonomy, 
even if it carries some risks to the players. Another related factor is that 
legal activities cause a net balance of utility, whereas prohibited activities 
do not.270 Claiming that the benefits of engaging in competitive sports 
outweigh the risks to the players is not an objective determination but one 
that requires a normative evaluation, which is contingent on non-neutral 
moral judgments about societal values. While boxing, football and other 
risky sports pose significant risks to human life and bodily integrity, they 
are nonetheless highly regulated activities, which are performed in closely-
supervised environments under strict rules and regulations. In contrast, 
illegal dangerous activities, such as using recreational drugs, are performed 
in unsupervised, unregulated private settings, which make alternative forms 
of regulation impossible. Therefore, engaging in life-threatening activities 
in unregulated settings justifies the state’s criminal regulation of these 
activities to secure the fundamental right life and bodily integrity.  
E.  Constitutional Implications  
Recall that currently, substantive criminal law survives constitutional 
scrutiny. 271  While courts apply the strict scrutiny test to evaluate the 
constitutionality of laws implicating fundamental rights such as free speech, 
criminal prohibitions are perceived as implicating only non-fundamental 
rights; therefore, courts assess their constitutionality under the rational basis 
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test under which the state only needs to show a conceivable legitimate 
purpose to enact the law in question, allowing most criminal prohibitions to 
pass constitutional scrutiny.272 
Several scholars have suggested that individuals have a constitutional 
right against excessive punishment. Douglas Husak, for example, suggests 
that all criminal prohibitions implicate the fundamental right not to be 
punished, and that all criminal laws ought to be assessed against the 
intermediate scrutiny standard of judicial review. 273  Under Husak’s 
proposal, the state must show that the law in question aims at a substantial 
state interest, directly advances that interest, and is no more extensive than 
necessary to achieve this objective. 274  While subjecting all criminal 
prohibitions to the intermediate level of judicial scrutiny may be viewed as 
a welcome direction in limiting the scope of criminalization, it defines the 
right in question—a general right not to be punished—too broadly, making 
the proposal too radical.  
In contrast, the aforementioned rules define the right in question more 
narrowly, applying the proposal only in the limited context of victimless 
crimes, thus arguably making the application of the heightened standard of 
judicial review potentially less objectionable. The proposal’s key idea is to 
base the right to engage in consensual conducts that do not inflict harm on 
third parties on the right to dignity as liberty and autonomy. Conceding that 
the right to dignity is a fundamental right ought to result in subjecting all 
criminal prohibitions that limit this right to a heightened standard of judicial 
review rather than to the current deferential rational basis test.  
To survive the more stringent intermediate standard of judicial review, 
the state would need to demonstrate that criminal prohibitions on victimless 
crimes are aimed at substantial state interests, that they advance those 
interests, and that criminalization is not more extensive than necessary to 
achieve the substantial state interest.275  Balancing between individuals’ 
right to liberty as dignity and the competing state interest to criminalize 
behaviors inflicting only harm to self would result in striking down criminal 
prohibitions in those categories of cases that do not significantly endanger 
individuals’ right to life or bodily integrity.  
IV.  APPLYING THE PROPOSAL TO RECREATIONAL DRUG PROHIBITIONS  
The following section focuses on one notable implication of the above 
theory by applying the proposed rules to recreational drug prohibitions.  
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A.  Why Drug Crimes? 
Why should a proposal to limit the scope of victimless crimes 
specifically aim at drug crimes rather than at other types of victimless 
crimes such as prostitution or gambling? Scholars criticizing the problem of 
overcriminalization in general, and the unjustified criminalization of 
victimless crimes in particular, often provide examples of obsolete criminal 
statutes, which demonstrate remnants of legal moralism that are 
unwarranted in a post-Lawrence era.276 Sara Sun Beale, for example, notes 
that despite the contemporary approach that sexual morality ought to 
remain beyond the scope of criminal regulation, a large number of states 
still criminalize fornication and adultery, and most states criminalize 
prostitution.277 However, these offenses are rarely enforced and represent a 
miniscule percentage of cases that reach the criminal justice system.278 
In sharp contrast, the most notable victimless offenses—drug crimes—
account for an enormous number of criminal convictions and incarcerated 
individuals in the country’s overcrowded prisons.279 Furthermore, the use of 
“soft” drugs such as marijuana is prevalent among many Americans, 
turning all users into potential criminals.280 According to estimates, while 
over 700,000 people are arrested every year for marijuana possession, over 
100 million Americans actually use the drug.281 This is a troubling finding, 
given that the prevalence of drug use increasingly expands the coercive 
powers and authorities of the government, in excess to measures used 
outside the drugs context.282 In practical terms, this expansion means more 
stops and arrests, more invasions of privacy in the form of home searches, 
and more intrusive bodily searches and pat downs.283 Scholars contend that 
the expansive “war on drugs” has resulted in “drugs exceptionalism”, under 
which the enforcement of drug crimes often precludes the protection of the 
same defendants’ rights regularly granted to other offenders.284 Moreover, 
drug laws carry a notably disparate impact on racial and national minorities, 
groups who are most affected by the continued criminalization of drugs.285  
In light of this reality, focusing on recreational drug prohibitions as 
paradigmatic examples of victimless crime rests on the premise that a 
change in substantive drug laws would have a dramatic impact on the 
                                                
 276.  See Strader, supra note 21. 
 277.  See Beale, supra note 3. 
 278.  See id. at 756-57. 
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 280.  See id. at 29. 
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criminal justice system, including significant decreases both in criminal 
convictions as well as in the country’s prison population. The following 
discussion argues that applying the proposed rules in the drug context 
would have the greatest effect on the criminal justice system by 
significantly limiting criminalization. 
B.  A Consequentialist Critique of Drug Prohibition  
The increasing dissatisfaction of scholars, policy makers, and the public 
at large with the government’s continuous “war on drugs” in the last forty 
years has resulted in voluminous writings concerning the numerous 
drawbacks in criminalizing the use and possession of recreational drugs, 
mainly marijuana. 286  However, the focus of this growing critique is 
typically not grounded in libertarian theories concerning individuals’ rights 
and autonomous choices to use recreational drugs, but rather in the 
dominant paradigms of consequentialist accounts of drug prohibitions, 
namely, in a cost/benefit analysis as the main justification for 
decriminalizing drug use and possession.287  
While the prohibition against the recreational use of drugs has 
historically been linked to moral reprobation, infused with racial and ethnic 
overtones, the most prevalent arguments raised today against drug 
prohibitions rest on the utilitarian law and economic critique.288 Arguably, 
in sharp contrast to other areas involving victimless crimes, such as the 
criminal regulation of sexual practices including same-sex sexual 
relationships, where normative, rights-based claims have been made to 
reject criminal bans on private consensual conducts, much less focus has 
been devoted to such arguments in the context of drug laws.  
In light of the prevalence of utilitarian harm arguments in American 
jurisprudence, modern proponents of the continued criminalization of 
recreational drugs do not ground their support for drug prohibitions on 
moral justifications. 289  Instead, they rely on harm-based arguments to 
advocate a blanket prohibition of all types of drugs.290 The common reasons 
                                                
 286.  See, e.g., DAVID BOYUM & PETER REUTER, AN ANALYTIC ASSESSMENT OF U.S. 
DRUG POLICY (2005); MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS 
(1992); ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM 
OTHER VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES 24-25 (2001). 
 287.  See Koppelman, supra note 78. 
 288.  See generally Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985) (contending that criminal sanctions, particularly when they 
take the form of imprisonment or death, are costly, yet they appear to be the optimal method 
of deterring most pure coercive transactions). 
 289.  See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK & PETER DE MARNEFFE, THE LEGALIZATION OF 
DRUGS 109-31 (2005). 
 290.  See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
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used to justify such a prohibition include the harmful impact of drugs on 
one’s health,291 the need to protect children from the harmful effects of 
drugs,292 the prevalence of drug-related crimes, and the argument that “soft” 
drugs lead to “hard” ones. 293  Moreover, to strengthen their position, 
proponents of prohibition advance economic-based justifications to 
criminalize drug use, contending that it places heavy burdens and financial 
costs on society.294  
Opponents contend that scientific evidence raises significant doubts 
regarding the harms of soft drugs, such as marijuana.295 As well, legal 
drugs—predominantly alcohol—can be more harmful than marijuana and 
yet are not criminalized.296 Furthermore, some soft drug use is thought to be 
less dangerous than a wide array of other harmful but legal activities, such 
as contact sports.297 Critics also reject the asserted link between drugs and 
crime, contending that the amount of systemic crime would be reduced by 
decriminalization; that many economic crimes are caused not by drugs 
themselves but by drug prohibitions; that criminalization is not an effective 
way to reduce economic crimes; and that research does not support the 
claim that drug use encourages violent behavior.298 
C.  Deontological Critique of Drug Prohibition  
In their focus on the enormous financial costs that the “war on drugs” 
put on the criminal justice system, scholars criticizing drug prohibition 
sometimes fail to fully consider a normative rights-based perspective.299 
Political and philosophical theorists, however, contend that drug laws are 
inherently suspect from a liberal perspective: in a free society, individuals 
should be allowed to make their own choices about using harmful 
substances without government intervention, and the onus is placed on the 
government to justify the interference with this personal liberty.300  
                                                                                                             
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY iii (2010).  
 291.  See HUSAK & DE MARNEFFE, supra note 289, at 41-53. 
 292.  Id. at 53-64. 
 293.  Id. at 64-71; see David Garland, Criminology, Crime Control, and “The American 
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 294.  See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 132-33 
(2007). 
 295.  See MITCH EARLEYWINE, UNDERSTANDING MARIJUANA: A NEW LOOK AT THE 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 143-44 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002). 
 296.  See HUSAK & DE MARNEFFE, supra note 289, at 42-53. 
 297.  Id. at 42-53. 
 298.  Id. at 67-71. 
 299.  See Koppelman, supra note 78, at 281-82. 
 300.  See HUSAK & DE MARNEFFE, supra note 289, at 84-95. 
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Joel Feinberg, David A.J. Richards, Douglas Husak and Michael Moore 
are among the most prominent theorists advocating for the 
decriminalization of drugs, based on the theory that liberalism is committed 
to protecting individuals’ rights to use recreational drugs.301 These liberal 
theorists and others contend that in light of ample scientific doubts 
regarding the harmful effects of drugs, the presumption of freedom ought to 
prevail since the evidentiary burden of proof lies with the state.302  
In his landmark book, David A.J. Richards contends that a liberal-based 
criminal justice system is premised on an autonomy-based concept, 
requiring the state to respect individuals’ ability to determine the meaning 
of their lives.303 Richards argues that one’s right to autonomous choice 
requires that the state refrain from criminalizing drug use as a means to 
enforce some choices over others.304 Douglas Husak advocates for the 
decriminalization of all types of drug use and possession. He reframes the 
core question in the debate as to whether the use of a given drug should be 
criminalized, rather than whether drug use should be decriminalized.305 
Moreover, Husak contends that no good argument in favor of criminalizing 
drug use has yet been made to justify criminalization.306 
Michael Moore further provides a strong argument against the 
criminalization of taking recreational drugs based on individuals’ right to 
liberty. He contends that a legislator may criminalize only that which he 
may condemn as morally wrong, and generally speaking, there is no breach 
of any moral obligation in taking recreational drugs.307  Moore further 
argues that since criminalization demands punishment, those who do no 
wrong cannot be punished, therefore drug taking, as a self-defining choice, 
should be protected by the basic right to liberty.308 
While these types of arguments are well known, they have not taken 
hold among legislatures, which has consequently resulted in a failure to 
promote fundamental changes in existing drug laws.309 Moreover, despite a 
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growing trend showing increasing support for the decriminalization of 
marijuana, 310  arguably no comprehensive change has occurred yet in 
societal attitudes toward drug use in general—and marijuana use in 
particular—as significant parts of the public continue to support criminal 
prohibitions on all types of drugs, including marijuana.311 
D.  Applying the Proposed Rules 
One reason that may account for the failure to promote fundamental 
change in American drug laws is the lack of a theoretical agreement among 
different communities about the appropriate legal line to draw between 
different types of recreational drugs. This view further suggests that the 
criminal law ought to consider a middle ground between individuals’ liberty 
rights and fundamental societal values and interests. This middle ground 
may require some points of agreement among competing philosophical 
theories. Ekow Yankah, for example, contends that the decriminalization of 
marijuana is practically possible because advocates of decriminalization can 
theoretically agree on a philosophical starting point, ideally resulting in 
consensus between liberals and non-liberals. 312  For liberals, the 
criminalization of marijuana is unjustified because it interferes with one’s 
freedom and autonomy.313 For virtue-based theorists, the criminalization of 
marijuana is unjustified because it results in diminishing society’s well-
being, therefore weakening, rather than fostering a virtuous society.314 
The following section carves out clear distinctions between different 
types of drugs and different types of drug-related activities. A main feature 
of current drug laws is their all-encompassing prohibition, a position that 
fails to appreciate the sharp distinctions between fundamentally distinct 
types of drugs based on their varying effects. Recall that under current drug 
laws, offenders are incarcerated for possession and use of all types of drugs, 
including marijuana.315 While a growing number of states allow personal 
use of marijuana with a doctor’s recommendation, and many local 
jurisdictions have relaxed their penalties for marijuana use and possession 
of small amounts of this drug, the complete decriminalization of marijuana 
                                                
 310.  See Joseph Carroll, Who Supports Marijuana Legalization?, GALLUP (Nov. 1, 
2005), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/19561/Who-Supports-Marijuana-
Legalization. aspx. 
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has not taken place at the federal level, and only two states currently 
legalize the possession, for recreational purposes, of less than one ounce of 
marijuana.316  
1.  Distinguishing “Soft” Drugs from “Hard” Drugs 
The distinction between different types of drugs in American drug laws 
rests on classifying all drugs into five schedules, depending on the 
combination of three factors: their medicinal value, potential for abuse and 
psychological and physical effects.317 This classification does not recognize 
a distinction between “soft” and “hard” drugs. For example, the Controlled 
Substances Act places both marijuana and heroin under Schedule I, the 
most severely restricted category, as drugs that have a high potential for 
abuse and no recognized medical use, while cocaine is designated as a 
Schedule II substance.318  
 Commentators have long criticized the Controlled Substances Act’s 
classification method319: William Stuntz, for example, has suggested a 
distinction between “serious” and “less serious” drug offenses, based not 
only on the nature of the crime—distribution versus possession—but also 
by the seriousness of the drug itself, which means distinguishing marijuana 
and similarly ‘soft’ drugs from ‘hard’ drugs like cocaine or heroin.320 
However, such proposals for alternative methods of distinguishing between 
different types of drugs based on their relative harmful effects have 
generally failed to take hold among legislatures and, more specifically, 
Congress has rejected proposals to reschedule marijuana.321 
In contrast with American drug laws, foreign countries such as the 
Netherlands differentiate between drugs based on their potential harm.322 
The proposed rules advocate this distinction, under which “soft” drugs 
include all products of the cannabis plant, including not only marijuana but 
                                                
 316.  See Richard Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United 
States and in the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 339-48 (2010); see also In the 
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91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971). 
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also hashish, while “hard” drugs include heroin, cocaine, amphetamines, 
and other chemically produced recreational drugs.  
The above line-drawing is based on the fundamental distinction 
between decriminalization of recreational drugs and their legalization.323 
Decriminalization entails abolishing criminal prohibitions on using and 
possessing recreational drugs. 324  Legalization, however, involves not 
merely lifting prohibitory bans on drug use but also abolishing the 
prohibitions on the production and sale of drugs.325 Given this distinction, 
the proposed rules advocate only the decriminalization of victimless crimes 
but not their legalization, therefore excluding drug trafficking from their 
scope.  
Moreover, the proposed rules are based on individuals’ rights to liberty, 
autonomy and dignity. Freely exercising these rights, which is this Article’s 
main focus, is unrelated to drug trafficking because criminal prohibitions on 
producing and selling drugs do not violate individuals’ autonomous choices 
to use them. Also, proposals to legalize the production and sale of 
recreational drugs are based on utilitarian arguments, mainly focusing on 
the economic gains which legalization would provide in the form of tax 
revenues. To the contrary, the proposed rules do not advocate for 
decriminalization based on economics, but instead for advancing a more 
just criminal justice system by drawing on the value of human dignity.326  
2.  Decriminalizing “Soft” Drugs 
A key issue concerning the decriminalization of use and possession of 
“soft” drugs, based on the concept of liberty as dignity, concerns the 
question of addiction. Addiction and substance abuse undercut the 
justification behind decriminalization; drug addicts do not exercise 
autonomous choices when using drugs, because the addiction effectively 
controls their lives.327 Scientific evidence, however, shows that “soft” drugs 
are not physically addictive, debunking the claim that “soft” drugs impair 
one’s capacity to exercise autonomous choices and advancing the case for 
decriminalization. 328  Put differently, the limited caveat supporting the 
government’s obligation to secure individuals’ right to life or bodily 
integrity is not demonstrated in the case of use of “soft” drugs.  
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3.  Continued Criminalization of “Hard” Drugs  
Advocating for the full decriminalization of use and possession of all 
types of drugs presents a challenge in light of two factors characterizing 
“hard” drugs: the significant harms and injuries incurred by users, and the 
addiction element. Recall that the secondary proposed rule, serving as a 
limiting caveat to the primary one, advocates for the continued 
criminalization of victimless crimes only when certain activities are 
exercised by individuals whose capacity to make autonomous choices is 
impaired or when the activities in question significantly endanger the right 
to life or bodily integrity. “Hard” drugs present the paradigmatic case where 
these two features are present, which justifies the application of the 
caveat—they are both extremely dangerous, significantly putting 
individuals’ right to life at risk, and highly addictive, thus undermining the 
justification of protecting individuals’ autonomous choices. 
The abuse of “hard” drugs not only poses health risks, but also creates a 
significant risk of death. For example, injecting heroin is a particularly 
common route of administration among heroin users, and can contribute to 
the clogging of the blood vessels that lead to the lungs, liver, kidneys, and 
brain. 329  Moreover, repeated intravenous injections can cause vascular 
sclerosis and lead the injectors to inject subcutaneously or intramuscularly, 
resulting in a series of infections, which may become lethal.330 HIV and 
other types of infections, such as hepatitis, along with depression of the 
immune system, are also serious concerns among injection drug users.331 As 
well, cocaine use presents significant health issues; the cardiovascular 
system is the system most often adversely affected by cocaine, which 
increases the risk of coronary artery disease.332 Studies suggest that cocaine 
users may often die suddenly as a result of having varying lethal doses of 
the substance in their systems.333 While these medical complications may 
vary depending on the individual, frequency of use, amount of dosage, and 
prior medical attributes, it is clear that abuse of many “hard” drugs 
significantly endangers individuals’ lives, therefore justifying their 
continued criminalization.  
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The significant risks of addiction associated with “hard” but not “soft” 
drugs are another factor supporting the proposed distinction between the 
two, thus explaining why only criminalization of the former is justified. The 
implications of the addiction factor are twofold: highly addictive drugs pose 
risks to bodily integrity and increase the likelihood of drug abuse and 
overdose, further supporting their continued criminalization. Moreover, in 
contrast with other risky activities, such as contact sports, recreational drug 
use is not supervised or regulated through alternative and less intrusive 
means. One of the notable drawbacks in criminalizing all types of drugs is 
that except for cases involving proscribed drugs for medicinal purposes, the 
state cannot effectively regulate or supervise drug use.334  
Liberal theorists have struggled with the question of whether choosing 
a life of regular drug use can qualify as a self-defining choice.335 Legal 
theorist Michael Moore, for example, contends that recreational drug use 
ought to be protected by the right to liberty, while a life of total addiction 
conflicts with one’s rationality and autonomy.336 Samuel Freeman agrees, 
suggesting that liberalism would permit regulation of only those drugs that 
“permanently or indefinitely impair our capacities for rational and moral 
agency.” 337  The question of prohibition, then, depends on whether a 
particular drug is so addictive as to deprive individuals of their abilities to 
make free autonomous choices.  
E.  Constitutionality under the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard 
Recall that the proposed rules are based on the premise that victimless 
crimes implicate the fundamental right to dignity and therefore ought to be 
subjected to heightened constitutional scrutiny. 338  While current drug 
prohibitions survive constitutional scrutiny under the deferential rational 
basis review, they are likely to fail to meet the requirements of the more 
stringent intermediate judicial review standard.339 In a post-Lawrence era, 
where demonstrating the presence of harm to others is a predicate for 
criminal prohibitions, states will have a hard time demonstrating that 
criminalizing the use of “soft” drugs serves a substantial state interest, that 
the prohibition advances this interest, and that criminalization is not too 
excessive to accomplish it.  
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Under the “substantial state interest” requirement, a state would need to 
demonstrate that the prohibition of the use of “soft” drugs is designed to 
reduce a substantial risk and the likelihood of ultimate harm—a 
requirement that would be hard to meet given the current scientific research 
indicating that “soft” drugs are not addictive and do not lead to death or 
other bodily injury.340 In contrast, even under the intermediate judicial 
scrutiny standard, the continued criminalization of “hard” drugs will likely 
survive constitutional scrutiny because states will be able to demonstrate a 
significant interest in upholding these criminal prohibitions, and 
consequently reducing substantial risks and the likelihood of ultimate harm.  
“Hard” drugs are addictive, increase the likelihood of abuse and 
overdose, and inflict significant health risks on users, thus justifying 
criminalization as a means to preserve individuals’ rights to life and bodily 
integrity. Furthermore, the harms of “hard” drugs extend to others because 
many users resort to criminal activities to feed their habit.341 Moreover, the 
risks of “hard” drugs often involve children, who are often neglected by 
their addicted parent(s).342 These state interests, in addition to the deterrent 
effect of criminalization, are sufficiently significant to justify prohibitions 
on “hard’ drugs. Finally, in light of the substantial risks that “hard” drugs 
pose, criminal prohibitions are not an excessive measure to reduce the 
likelihood of these risks. 
CONCLUSION 
While scholars disagree about the legal means that should be employed 
to accomplish change, few dispute the urgent need for change in the 
criminal justice system. In light of this reality, the time is ripe for revisiting 
both substantive criminal law’s “hands-off” approach to adopting 
constitutional constraints on criminal statutes, as well as for reconsidering 
the role that substantive criminal law may play in limiting the scope of 
criminalization. 
This Article has proposed one mechanism to limit overcriminalization 
of victimless crimes, particularly drug crimes, by using the notion of human 
dignity as a constitutional constraint on criminalization. It has demonstrated 
that the law needs to adopt a balancing test to reconcile conflicting 
understandings of human dignity and that, in light of the key role that 
liberty plays in American jurisprudence, the concept of liberty as dignity 
ought to outweigh the competing interest of communitarian virtue as 
dignity. The proposed rule requires that the state not interfere with 
individuals’ autonomous free choices regarding how to best live their lives. 
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Favoring this concept of dignity further requires the state to decriminalize 
consensual conducts between adults, even if they inflict harm upon the 
participants, provided that they are harmless to third parties.  
Conceding that no rule is absolute, the Article has identified the limited 
circumstances under which communitarian virtue as dignity may outweigh 
individuals’ liberty interests, requiring the continued criminalization of 
consensual activities that pose significant risks to individuals, because the 
key right to life outweighs individuals’ liberty interests in engaging in 
potentially fatal activities. Adopting such a balancing test should pass 
constitutional muster under the intermediate scrutiny standard.  
 
 
